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ABSTRACT
DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION IN INDONESIA:
INFLUENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
Ronnie Rahman Nataatmadja, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Kurt Thurmaier, Director
This study examines the role of the middle class in influencing local government
spending and political turnovers in a decentralized Indonesia. It analyzes the changes in pattern
of education and infrastructure spending in the pre and post decentralization era, specifically the
changes due to the implementation of direct mayoral election in municipalities that began in
2005. The study finds that in the post direct election era, education and infrastructure spending
are higher. For education spending, the increase is amplified by the presence of the middle class.
As the size of the middle class in a city increases, the effect of decentralization on education
spending becomes stronger. On the other hand, the effect of decentralization on infrastructure
spending is attenuated by the size of the middle class in cities.
In addition, the middle class amplifies the effect of local government performance on
political turnover of mayors. The effect of elementary school enrollment rate on mayors’ votes is
stronger as the size of the middle class in a city increases. This study finds no conclusive results
on the effect of the middle class on political turnovers of city council members. Last, the study
qualitatively explores the role of nongovernmental organizations in influencing local government
decision-making and building the capacity of the citizens in ensuring local government
accountability.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Decentralization has been prescribed to fix problems in the public sector in both
developed and developing countries. Development agencies such as the World Bank has been
supporting decentralization efforts in countries it assists since the early 1970s. In the 1970s,
decentralization was prescribed by development agencies that recognized the limitation of two
decades of central planning following World War II (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). The World
Bank notes that during the 1980s most developing countries and countries in transitional regimes
embarked in decentralization. Out of 75 countries, only 12 countries did not have some transfer
of power to lower level governments (Crook & Manor, 1998). Following the fall of the
communist regime in the early 1990s, both the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
prescribed decentralization in facing the changes in East European countries (Cheema &
Rondinelli, 2007). During the end of the millennium, per an evaluation by the World Bank in
2008, the institution supported decentralization efforts in 20 countries during the 1990-2007
period (World Bank, 2008).
The argument is that local governments that are closer to the citizens can better capture
local preferences compared to the national government. Allocative efficiency of public service
provision will improve since local governments can easily tailor services to meet the demands.
Local government officials are more accountable to the citizens and at the same time
decentralization provides more opportunity for citizens to participate in policy making of public
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services. Presumably, citizens have more influence in a relatively smaller municipal city council
than a large parliament in the capital of the country which consists of multiple regions and has
more diverse problems to manage.
Oates (1972) argues that a decentralized system is more efficient compared to a
centralized system of public service provision. Assuming a benevolent ruler, this efficiency
would eventually increase the well-being of the citizens. This is because there is less distortion of
information between the citizens and the local government. In addition to that, decentralization
would create a competitive market for local governments. Competition among local governments
can drive the cost of public service down, forcing local governments to be more efficient in
allocating available resources. Tiebout (1956) argues that in a decentralized system citizens can
vote with their feet. They search for a municipality that would maximize their benefit at a price
they are willing to pay. Along the same lines, New Public Management changes the paradigm of
public service to see citizens as customers of goods and services and to be responsive to the
change in the citizens’ demands. All of this is supposed to create local governments that are
quick to respond to changes in the society.
However, research on the impact of decentralization on the provision of public service
especially in developing countries seems inconclusive. Some research finds that decentralization
does improve public service, but others see no improvement or even negative impacts. For
example, decentralization has been argued to have an influence on economic growth of
countries. Decentralization of local public goods provision will lead to fiscal policies that are
conducive for businesses since local governments must compete for taxation from businesses and
citizens. Thus, local governments need taxation policies as well as public services that support

3
the development of businesses and attract people to live in the city. As an aggregate, the
competition among the local governments should create a better economic development for the
country. However, the results have been mixed even in a one country study. Using China as an
example, one can find research with two different conclusions. Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez, and Xu
2008) and Iimi (2005) argue that decentralization has been associated with higher economic
growth in China. On the other hand, Zhang and Zou (1998) find that despite the higher
investment in decentralization, the investment, in fact, leads to a lower economic growth in
provinces. The lower economic growth is because decentralization diverted revenue and
spending capability of the national government from building key infrastructures such as
highways, energy, and railways which have a larger multiplier effect on growth.
One important premise is that decentralization is attributed to a more responsive local
government. Local governments are smaller and closer to the citizens thus the local government
can better capture the demands of the citizens and adjust their services compared to a centralized
national government. However, the research has also been mixed. For example, Faguet (2004)
finds evidence that patterns of investment in human capital and social services such as water,
education, agriculture and urban development, changed after decentralization in Bolivia. The
changes in investments after decentralization are strongly related to the needs of the local
government. However, Jia, Guo, and Zhang (2014) find that decentralization leads to
imbalanced fiscal spending. Decentralization increases overall spending for large capital but
decreases spending for education and administration.
One should note that decentralization theories imply an institutionalized democracy. The
literature on decentralization assumes that decentralization is situated in a democratic system that
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is working properly. An institutionalized democracy means that first, among others, there are
regular elections as a means of electing officials that represent the preference of the citizens
regarding policies. Second, as asserted by Lipset (1959) and others, there is a significant
presence of a middle class that is engaged in ensuring democracy is on the right track.
This study examines the impact of Indonesia’s recent decentralization initiative on the
improvement in public service provision by analyzing the changes in local public expenditure on
education and infrastructure in municipalities before and after decentralization. It addresses the
theoretical gap regarding whether an engaged middle class is a contingent factor in the
Indonesian reform. Using a one-country study to analyze the relationship between the middle
class and decentralization allows us to control for institutional differences that most likely exist
in a multi-country study.
Moreover, the implementation of decentralization in 2001 allows us to perform a natural
experiment of pre and post decentralization which rarely can be done. The study tests not only
whether the presence of the middle class is important in ensuring decentralization works, but
whether the middle class needs to be distributed equally throughout the country to ensure that
local governments are responsive to citizens’ demands in education and infrastructure. The study
finds that after the implementation of direct local mayoral election we see changes in education
and infrastructure spending in local governments where there is a significant presence of the
middle class. At the same time, the middle class also has an impact in making sure that local
governments are held accountable for their actions. The presence of the middle class in
municipalities amplifies the reward and punishment mechanism of citizens on local government
performance. Political turnover is higher when there is a sizable middle class in municipalities.
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The study is formatted as follows: The rest of Chapter 1 elaborates the history and current
decentralized system in Indonesia. It explains why Indonesia is the perfect case to use in the
study of decentralization. Chapter 2 discusses the theory of decentralization. The chapter
provides a brief overview of research on decentralization. It highlights the impact of political
variables on decentralization and public service provision in general. Subsequently, I discuss the
theory of democracy and the importance of the middle class, both of which are missing from the
literature of decentralization. The chapter also provides details on the research questions and
hypotheses. Chapter 3 elaborates the research design and data utilized to answer the research
questions. In Chapter 4, I analyze the data and discuss the findings of the quantitative analysis.
Chapter 5 elaborates the qualitative findings on the roles of the middle class and NGOs in
ensuring that local governments are held accountable. Chapter 6 provides the conclusion,
recommendations, and limitation of the study.
Indonesia Past and Present
Indonesia is a perfect case to analyze the relationship between the middle class and
decentralization. A one country study allows us to control for heterogeneity that most likely is
present in a multi country study. Using Indonesia as the object of study allows us to control for
as many institutional differences as possible, such as the form of governments (unitary or
federal), the degree of power given to the local government, and colonial legacy, while still
having a large number of observations needed for quantitative analysis. Moreover, the
implementation of decentralization in 2001 allows us to perform a natural experiment of pre-and
post-decentralization, which rarely can be done.
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After 32 years of centralized and authoritarian regimes, Indonesia embarked in both
democratization and decentralization. In 1999, the first free election was held, and 48 political
parties competed for electoral seats in the local, provincial and national governments. The
members of the parliament in each level then elected an executive—president, governor, and
mayor—for a five-year term. The executives were then accountable to the legislative bodies.
At the same time, democratization in the political system was accompanied by
administrative and fiscal decentralizations. Through Law 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy,
municipalities (kota and kabupaten) are given more authority to run their respective
governments. Almost all functions of the government are delegated to the municipalities except
for religion, national defense, justice, policing, monetary policy and international relation. In
addition to the law on regional autonomy, Law 25/1999 on Central-Regional Fiscal Balance
regulates intergovernmental transfer and taxes shared by the central to the provincial and local
government. These laws were put into effect in 2001. In 2004, to improve democracy at the local
level, the national parliament enacted Law 32/2004 on Local Government which gives the
opportunity for citizens to elect executive leaders at the provincial and local government levels.
Before decentralization, all political and administrative decisions at the province and
local levels were decided by the central government in Jakarta since its independence in 1945.
Through the tenure of Soekarno (1945-1966), the first president, and Soeharto the second
president (1966-1998) regional autonomy was seen as a threat to national unity; thus, local
government existed as an extension and mainly carried out policies of the central government
(Eckardt & Shah, 2006). The first law on regional government was a centralized approach under
Law 22/1948. In 1957, the Law 1/1957 gave more autonomy to local governments; however, the
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presidential decree in 1959 undermined the law and changed the political system to a ‘guided
democracy’ which concentrated the power under President Soekarno (Legge, 1961).
A centralized system was also continued under Soeharto’s regime. Although there was an
effort to decentralize the system through Law 5/1974, Jaya and Dick (2001) argue that the law
did not reverse the trend toward centralization. The central government still controlled much of
the decisions at the local level. Before decentralization in 1999, the relationship between local,
provincial and central governments was largely hierarchical. Local and provincial governments
were merely implementing programs of the central government. Thus, local government officials
had more incentive, financially and career-wise, to be more accountable to officials at a higher
level of government rather than the citizens in their jurisdiction. Their careers depended on how
well they could run the programs of the central government, not how they responded to the
demands of the communities. The hierarchical relationship insulated local and provincial
government officials from public accountability. A centralized administrative and fiscal structure
also hampered the development of local institutions (Eckardt & Shah, 2006; Shah, 1999).
Indonesia: Current Decentralized System

After Soeharto’s regime fell in 1998, the Law 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy gave local
governments authority in determining public service provision. In 2004, the national parliament
created new laws—Law 32/2004 on Local Governments and Law 33/2004 on Fiscal
Decentralization—which further cemented the effort of administrative decentralization. The new
laws further clarify the responsibility of each level of government. The new laws provide more
detail about the tasks and relationships between the central, provincial, and local government. In
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addition to the new laws strengthening the administrative autonomy of local governments, the
new Law 32/2004 expanded political decentralization in that the law gave the opportunity for
citizens to directly elect mayors and governors through an election held every five years.
Indonesia currently consists of 34 provinces and more than 500 municipalities. There are
two types of municipalities under the province level. The first is a kota which is translated as
“city.” The head of the municipality is called walikota or mayor. The second type of
municipality is a kabupaten or district which is headed by a bupati or head district. There are two
main differences between the two types of municipalities. First, in terms of the head of the
lowest unit of government under each municipality. The head of the lowest sub-unit of a city is
called a lurah, and this lurah is appointed by the mayor. On the contrary, the head of the lowest
sub-unit of a district is called a kepala desa or village head who is directly elected by the citizens
of a village (see Figure 1 for a summary). The second difference is that kota are mainly
comprised of urban areas while kabupaten are mainly comprised of rural areas. Overall 80% of
municipalities are districts, and only about 20% are cities.

Walikota

Elected mayor

Non elected local
goverment
employee

Non elected local
goverment
employee

Camat

Lurah

Lurah

Figure 1. Structures of municipalities.

Bupati

Elected district head

Camat

Non elected local
goverment
employee

Lurah

Elected village head

Camat

Kepala
Desa

Camat

Kepala
Desa

Kepala
Desa
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The size of the city parliament varies from a minimum of 20 to a maximum 50 members
depending on the size of the population; municipalities range in population size from 25,000 in
Sabang to 4 million in Bandung. The average population is 480,000 (Eckardt & Shah, 2006).
About 400 municipalities are rural towns or kabupaten while about 100 are urban municipalities
or kota.
Based on the laws, local governments are responsible for all public matters expect for
five realms: foreign relations, judiciary and law enforcement, religious affairs, macroeconomic
and monetary policies, and defense policies. According to the Law 22/1999, the functions of subnational governments are agriculture, capital investment, cooperatives, communication,
education, environment, employment promotion, health, infrastructure, industry and trade, land
administration. In 2004, the Law 32/2004 on regional autonomy expanded and specified the
authority of local governments to: development planning, planning and zoning, public order and
peace, providing public means and facilities, handling of health sector, education, social affairs,
employment promotion, facilitating development of cooperatives and small and medium-size
businesses, environment, agriculture, demographics and social registry, administration affairs,
capital investments and other affairs according to laws and regulations.
Provinces have a double purpose as the extension of the national government as well as
an autonomous region above the municipalities. However, provinces have fewer responsibilities
compared to the municipalities; their duties are mostly supervising and intervening in crossmunicipality jurisdictional matters.
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Local Revenue and Expenditure
Local government revenue can be divided into two categories: (1) inter-governmental
transfers which include shared taxes and revenue (Dana Bagi Hasil or DBH), General Allocation
Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) and Special Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus or
DAK); and (2) local revenue sources or (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or PAD). According to Law
no 34/2000, local governments have several tax bases (Table 1). The maximum rates are
regulated by a law enacted by the parliament in Jakarta, but cities can freely determine the rate of
fees for services provided. Municipalities can propose new taxes or fees; however, they must be
approved by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior.
The shared revenues are incomes generated from natural resources within a city. The
Indonesian constitution stipulates that natural resources are owned and controlled by the central
government. The shared taxes are taxes generated from properties or income of population
within a municipality. The revenues are collected by the central government and distributed to
the cities using the following formulas in Table 2.
General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU)
The general allocation grant is used by local governments to fund their fiscal gaps and
wage expenses. Basic allocation is the wage expenditure of a city. The fiscal gap is calculated by
considering the projected shared revenue and taxes plus the local revenue sources (Fiscal
capacity) and expenditure (Fiscal need). Any gap between fiscal capacity and fiscal need is filled
by the general allocation fund using the following formula.
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Table 1
Local Revenue Sources (Eckard & Shah, 2006)
Local taxes
Hotel taxes - Maximum 10%
Restaurant taxes - Maximum 10%
Entertainment taxes - Maximum 35%
Street light taxes - Maximum 10%
Billboard or advertisement taxes - Maximum 25%
Extraction of mineral Class C - Maximum 20%
Parking taxes - Maximum 20%
Local fees
General service fee
Health service fee
Waste management fee
ID card and civil registry fee
Funeral fee
Street parking fee
Market service fee
Car emission testing fee
Fire inspection fee
Service fee
Public facility fee
Market or Retail Fee
Auctioneering fee
Bus terminal fee
Docking fee
Motel and villa fee
Septic tank fee
Slaughterhouse fee
Water transportation fee
Sport and recreational facility fee
Liquid waste processing fee
Sales of local government
production
License fee
Construction license fee
Alcohol license fee
Disturbance fee
Public transportation route license fee
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Table 2
Shared Revenue and Taxes (Eckard & Shah, 2006)
Shared revenue
Forestry

Mining
Land rent

Royalty

16% for central government
16% for province
64% for city
16% for central government
16% for province
64% for city in which the mine resides
16% for central government
16% for province
32% for city in which the mine resides
32% other cities within the province

Fishery

20% for central government
80% for all cities in Indonesia, equally distributed

Oil

84.5% for central government
3% for province
6% for city producing the oil
6% other cities within the province
0.5% for basic education expense within the province

Natural Gas

69.5% for central government
6% for province
12% for city producing the gas
12% for other cities within the province,
0.5% for basic education expense within the province

Geothermal

20% for central government
16% for province
32% for city producing the geothermal
32% other cities within the province

Shared taxes
Property tax

Income tax

9% for central government
16.2% for province
64.8% for city contributing the property tax
10% distributed equally to all cities at the national level
80% for central government
8% for province
12% for city contributing the income tax
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DAU =

Basic allocation +

(Fiscal need of a city – Fiscal capacity of a city) x ∑ DAU for all cities
Fiscal gap of all cities in Indonesia

∑ DAU = net income of the central government – (shared revenue + shared taxes distributed to the cities)

The minimum amount of general allocation fund is 26% of the national net income minus the
shared revenue and shared taxes distributed to the cities.
Special Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus or DAK)
The special allocation fund is a conditional grant. This grant is designed to fund specific
projects to narrow the economic gaps between regions in Indonesia. The central government
specifies a yearly Government Work Plan which as of 2010 can be translated as local
expenditures in education, health, infrastructure (roads, irrigation, water, and sanitation), local
government facilities, fisheries, agriculture and environment, family planning, forestry, trade and
village infrastructure. Eligibility is determined by calculating an index based on general,
technical and special criteria. In the general criteria, the central government gives priority to
cities with low fiscal capacity, or in other words cities with high fiscal gap have a high
preference to receive the fund. The technical criteria will evaluate cities based on past
implementation of special allocation funds and the feasibility of allocating the fund for one
purpose based on the existing bureaucratic and institutional capacity of the city. The special
criteria consider specific regional characteristics of cities such as cities in remote areas, cities
bordering a foreign country, districts in provinces with special autonomy such as Papua and
West Papua and disaster prone areas.
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Local Expenditure
As shown in Table 3, local governments spend mainly on education, general
administrative expense, public works, health, and agriculture. On average municipalities spend
the largest bulk of their budget for education (34.65%), followed by general administrative
expense (25%) and public works (13%). Health expense is on average 10%, and agriculture
accounts for 2.54% of the municipalities’ budgets. Other expenses include spending on social
affairs, labor, cooperatives and small businesses, investment, culture, youth and sports, national
unity and domestic politics, civil service training, village empowerment, statistics, archive and
records, development planning, transportation, environment, land, civil registry, women
empowerment, family planning, IT and communication food security, library, forestry, energy
and natural resources, tourism, fishery, trade, industry a and transmigration.1 These expenses
range from 0.1 to 1% of the total expenditure.

Table 3
Local Government Expenditures in 2013
Sector
Education
General administrative expense
Other expenses
Public works
Health
Agriculture

Average Expenditure (%)
34.65
25
14.5
13
9.96
2.54

Source: calculated from data from 2013 Local Government Budget, Directorate General of Fiscal Balance of
Ministry of Finance.

1

Transmigration is a government program to relocate people from overpopulated to under-populated regions.
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Figure 2 shows that the trend of total spending in municipalities is increasing. There is a
change in slopes of the average total local government spending when the direct election began
in 2005. It seems that when the direct election of mayors was established, total spending is
increasing. Education spending and infrastructure spending are also slightly increasing.
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Figure 2. Local government spending (average).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Decentralization and Decentralization Theorem
Politically, decentralization is an attractive option for countries that are undergoing a
change from an authoritarian regime. Decentralization can diffuse the power of an overly strong
central government and diffuse the conflicts that arise from a divided society (Weingast, 2009,
2014). In Indonesia, decentralization was proposed as a solution to the long discontent of the
regions against the central government that they viewed as disproportionally spending the
income from natural resources while leaving regions with almost nothing (Ahmad & Brosio,
2009; Hofman & Kaiser, 2004). Decentralization in Africa is viewed as a way to distribute
power among the different tribes and ethnic groups (Boko, 2002). Decentralization also creates a
certain boundary for losers of elections in the central government. In the context of developing
countries, the cost of losing an election in a centralized system could be very high; conversely
subverting the outcome of an election is cheaper. In a decentralized system, losers can use local
political strongholds to build power to recapture the central government in the future. The
distribution of power through decentralization puts a limit on coups and could stabilize
democracy (Weingast, 2009, 2014).
From a public administration perspective, decentralization should lead to a better
provision of public service since public officials are closer to the citizens. These officials are
better able to capture and respond to the changes in types and quantities of public services
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needed by the citizens (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993; Osborne, 2002). Public officials are
accountable to the citizens, and at the same time, the proximity between citizens and public
officials gives a chance for citizens to be more involved in the decision-making of local
governments.
There are three types of decentralization. In deconcentration, certain functions of the
central government are delegated to field offices in the regions. These field offices have some
authority to make decisions in their respective regions. Devolution gives local governments more
authority to provide services and infrastructure as well as establishing local policies. The third
type is delegation in which local governments, NGOs, and private sector firms are given full
autonomy to manage certain aspects of the provision of public services (Cheema & Rondinelli,
2007; Cohen & Peterson, 1999).
According to Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), there have been three waves of
decentralization in the world. The first was in the 1970s after two decades of centralized
planning following World War II. There was an effort in countries to decentralize public service
provision for the reason of efficiency and extending coverage. There was recognition from
governments and international development agencies that there are limitations of central
government planning. International agencies viewed that development primarily depended on
local government and communities; central economic planning with trickle-down effect did not
improve human conditions and equity. This notion is influenced by changes in the paradigm of
development in which development does not only mean economic growth but also an
improvement in human life conditions or human development, reduction in inequality and
fulfillment of basic needs.
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Governments in developing countries and international development agencies started
paying attention in pro-poor programs which intend to increase participants in the development
process as well as reducing inequality (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). This concept of
development notes that there is a reciprocal relationship between economic growth and human
development. Economic growth is necessary for human development, but human development is
also an important aspect to promote economic growth (United Nations Development Programme,
1991). This approach of development needs local participation to determine the goals, plan and
carry out actions and the best way to ensure this is through a decentralized system (Cheema &
Rondinelli, 1983). Along the lines with the argument of Oates (1972), local communities know
better what is needed by them. In this case, they know better the policies on public services and
goods than the central government. Local governments should be responsible for determining the
base and rate for immobile tax bases in their jurisdictions such as property tax, business license
tax, and fees. Thus, decentralization was viewed as a way to improve public service provision
and economic growth but beyond that decentralization should also improve human life condition
(Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983, 2007; United Nations Development Programme, 1991).
The second wave happened in the 1980s. During this period, there were more impulses
toward decentralization due to the slow economic growth of centralized planning, and the
development of international trade as well as globalization. The global economic changes were
also accompanied by changes in the political system. The Cold War was nearing an end,
authoritarian regimes in Latin America fell, and in the 1990s the end of the Cold War led to the
dismantling of the communist regime in East European countries. These give way for
governments to transition to market economics and the increase in the role of the private sector,
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privatizing state-owned companies and reducing large government central bureaucracy. In these
countries, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank prescribed decentralization as an
adjustment needed to accommodate these changes (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).
The third wave was in the 1990s. The New Public Management (NPM) with its emphasis
on minimizing the government as a way to improve efficiency started in developed countries
(Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). In the United States, it can be argued the prominent book by
Osborne and Gaebler (1993) drove the NPM movement. The rise of New Public Management
can be attributed to the state ideology that opposes large government in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s such as in the British government under Margaret Thatcher’s neo-conservative
government (Kettl, 2000). The difference between NPM and the previous decentralization waves
is that NPM does not only distribute work of government to smaller units but also emphasizes
implementing paradigm of the private sector into the public sector such as competition and
viewing citizens as customers.
NPM is seen as a way to slow down government growth. Its theoretical bases are public
choice and managerialism (Hood, 1991). Managerialism infuses private sector management into
the public sector, while public choice theory introduces market competition into public service
provision (Rhodes, 1996). The movement started in New Zealand, United Kingdom and
Australia (Gruening, 2001). The municipal level NPM started in Sunnyvale, California
(Gruening, 2001). According to the proponents of NPM, governments need to use market
solutions to fix the inefficiency in the bureaucracy. Government’s role in providing public
services should be minimized, by contracting out most of the public services and also including
performance measures to increase public sector efficiency (Gruening, 2001).
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NPM has several features that are different from traditional public service provision.
First, market competition is used as a way to achieve performance and efficiency of public
service provisions (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; Hood, 1991). Competition is used to lower costs
and increase standards of services (Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). The entrepreneurial
spirit in public management puts an emphasis on the government to earn revenues rather than to
spend (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). Second, a results-oriented government emphasizes results or
outputs rather than procedures. Explicit standards and performance measurements are created.
The reasoning is that accountability requires some clearly defined goals (Denhardt & Denhardt,
2011; Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). As a downside, in NPM, reinvention of
government is somewhat limited to privatization (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011).
Third, there is a stress on parsimony and discipline in the use of public sector resources.
This means cutting costs. Fourth, administrators are supposed to engage in anticipatory
government. They are supposed to prevent problems rather than fixing them. Fifth, citizens are
viewed as customers rather than citizens (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; Hood, 1991).
Bureaucracy is supposed to meet the needs of the customers rather than the bureaucracy itself
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). A final feature of the NPM model is the preference for
disaggregation and decentralization of units in the public sector--as well as deregulation--that
aims to increase flexibility and responsiveness of the government (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011;
Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). Government agencies are split up into units that support
products rather than having a monolithic form of government. Smaller governmental units are
thought to be easier to manage and more flexible in facing changes in the environment.
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Decentralization Theorem

From the perspective of public economics, in decentralization, the provision of public
services will have greater allocative efficiency since municipalities can tailor supply based on the
needs of the local citizens. According to Oates (1972), a locally controlled government is more
efficient compared to a centrally controlled uniformed provision of public service. Allocative
efficiency under decentralization would be better compared to a centralized system. Assuming a
benevolent ruler, decentralization would lead to an increase in the welfare gains of the citizens.
Oates (1972) states:
For a public good—the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the
total population, and for which the cost of providing each level of output of the good in
each jurisdiction are the same for the central or the respective local government—It will
always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the
Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central
government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across jurisdiction. (p.
35)
There is an assumption in the decentralization theorem that preferences differ in each
location and central government provides a uniform level of public service at the local level.
Thus, the efficiency from decentralization occurs from allowing every subnational region to
supply public goods and services according to the demands of their constituents. At the same
time, decentralization also will improve accountability. The reason is that public officials
deciding the provision are closer to the citizens who are using the public services. Using
Hirschman (1970) classification on ways to express concerns on government policies, it will be
relatively easier for citizens to voice their opinions. As a result, the local governments are forced
to be more accountable for their actions.
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In addition, the theorem argues that decentralization creates a competitive market for
local governments. Competition among local governments can drive the cost of public service
down, forcing local governments to be more efficient. Tiebout (1956) argues that in a
decentralized system, citizens can vote with their feet. They search for a municipality that would
maximize their benefit. Contrary to Samuelson (1954) who believes that public goods exist
because it cannot be treated as a normal good in a market, Tiebout (1956) argues that there is a
market solution for public goods if the goods are locally provided. An approximately efficient
and decentralized allocation of resources can be achieved with local public goods through a
market mechanism. Citizens can choose a community that maximizes their utility and leave the
community if their preferences are not met or in Hirschman’s term they can exit. Tiebout’s
proposition assumes that consumers are fully mobile and will move to a place where their set of
preferences is maximized and that consumers have perfect information on the pattern of
expenditures and revenues in communities and will respond to these differences.
In newer studies on the decentralization theorem, the benevolent ruler assumption has
been adjusted to assume that politicians are self-maximizing rulers. This approach to the theory
of decentralization has been influenced by scholars in public choice such as Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) and Niskanen (1974). According to this view, politicians maximize their utility
by increasing taxes or enlarging the size of the bureaucracy. Brennan and Buchanan (1980)
argue that decentralization creates competition among cities that can increase overall welfare by
constraining the growth of government. This is because revenue maximizing self-interested
politicians are constrained by competition among local governments. Under Brennan and
Buchanan’s proposition, decentralization serves as a constraint of the revenue maximizing
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bureaucrats to tax. They argue that efficiency from decentralization would come from the fact
that government size would be smaller.
One must note that there are arguments against decentralization. This line of literature
argues that decentralization leads to difficulty in managing macroeconomic policy. According to
Ter-Minassian (1997), this is because regions have their own fiscal policies which may have
different goals. Thus, decentralization may hamper the central government’s effort in stabilizing
the economy. Furthermore, dependency on intergovernmental transfer to fund local government
expenditure can lead to wasteful spending (Prud’homme, 1995).
The second problem is decentralization can create inefficiency in the production of public
service. This is because the hidden assumption in the decentralization theorem is that the
production of public services is technically efficient at the local level. It is possible that the
public service or goods are at an uneconomic scale when moved to the local level because the
economies of scale of the public goods is at a national level (Prud’homme, 1995). Last,
decentralization might also be accompanied by a decentralization of corruption. One the one
hand, the “benefits” from a decentralized corruption is more distributed to the local level
compared to a centralized corruption. However, at the same time corruption distributes the
inefficiency to the local levels where they are fewer obstacles to corruption. As an aggregate, the
impact of corruption worsens (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 2002).
Research on Decentralization
The empirical research on the impact of decentralization has been mixed. First,
decentralization has been argued to influence economic growth of a country. Decentralization of
local public goods provision will also lead to fiscal policies that are conducive for businesses
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since local governments must compete for taxation from businesses and citizens. Thus, local
governments need taxation policies as well as public services that support the development of
businesses and attract people to live in the city. As an aggregate, the competition among the local
governments should create a better economic development for the country. Scholars such as
Feld, Kirchgassner, and Schaltegger (2004) argue that in Switzerland, faster economic growth is
associated with decentralization. Qiao et al. (2008) and Iimi (2005) also argue that
decentralization has been associated with higher economic growth in China. However, there are
positive as well as negative impacts of decentralization on economic development. Zhang and
Zou (1998) find that despite the higher investment in decentralization, investment in fact leads to
a lower economic growth. This is because decentralization diverted revenue and spending
capability of the national government from building key infrastructures such as highways,
energy, and railways which have a larger multiplier effect on growth. Brueckner (2006) finds
that decentralization leads to a lower output per labor which eventually decreases growth.
Davoodi and Zou (1998) find that overall decentralization does not have a positive impact on
economic growth; the impact is negative in developing countries while there is no impact in
developed countries.
Second, decentralization has been attributed to a more responsive local government as the
decentralization theorem argues. Scholars such as Faguet (2004) find evidence that patterns of
investment in human capital and social services such as water, education, agriculture and urban
development, changed after decentralization in Bolivia. The changes in investments after
decentralization are strongly related to the needs of the local government. Similarly, Lewis
(2005) also finds that the patterns of local government spending change after decentralization.
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An increase in poverty in rich cities is followed by more spending in agriculture, while in nonrich cities poverty increase is followed by an increase in health and education spending. On the
contrary, Jia et al. (2014) find that decentralization leads to imbalanced fiscal spending.
Decentralization increases overall spending for large capital but decreases spending for
education and administration. At the same time, revenue decentralization does not have an
impact on local government expenditures. However, contrary to Jia et al. (2014), Borge,
Brueckner, and Rattsø (2014) find that even partial decentralization in which local governments
are only mostly responsible for managing spending still lead to more responsive local
government provision. As a caveat, scholars such as Platteau (2009) also suggest the possibility
that local governments can also be captured by the elites, in a sense that local government
spending deviates from the needs of the citizens as a whole.
Third, how does this responsiveness in local governments, particularly in changes in the
pattern of revenue and spending, affect the citizens, especially in improving human life
conditions? The impact of decentralization on education and health has been somewhat positive.
For example in education, Simatupang (2009) finds that girls and literacy rates improved after
decentralization. In Colombia, Faguet and Sánchez (2008) find that after decentralization school
enrollment increases. Barankay and Lockwood (2007) find that education attainment increases as
decentralization increases. Habibi et al. (2003) find that decentralization is associated with higher
enrollment in secondary education.
In the health sector, Habibi et al. (2003) find that decentralization in Argentina has been
associated with lower infant mortality. Cavalieri and Ferrante (2016) also find lower infant
mortality in local governments that have higher decision-making autonomy in taxing.
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Khaleghian (2004) finds that expenditure decentralization in middle and low-income countries is
associated with improved health outcomes especially related to immunization.
In terms of poverty and inequality, the empirics also have been mixed. Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez (2010), and Lindaman and Thurmaier (2002) find that human development
index as a proxy for basic needs fulfillment increases with decentralization. However,
decentralization can also negatively impact poverty; for example, West and Wong (1995) find
that decentralization has led to a lower public service that is needed for impoverished citizens in
non-rich regions. Related to poverty, Song (2013) also finds spending and revenue
decentralization increase inequality while recentralization reduce inequality although modestly.
Decentralization is supposed to reduce corruption from the increased accountability and
competition among local governments. However, the research also has been mixed. Fisman and
Gatti (2002) find that decentralization is associated with lower corruption. However, Fan, Lin,
and Treisman (2009) find that the decrease in corruption is conditional on the share of revenue
local governments generate. When local government revenue share is larger as a share of GDP,
decentralization decreases corruption. Otherwise, decentralization increases corruption.
Decentralization is also found to increase the chances of corruption since there are more officials
at the local levels who have control over policy decisions are directly dealing with investors
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).
Finally, does decentralization curb government spending and restrain the size of
government? The literature again has been mixed. Marlow (1988) finds that in the US, fiscal
decentralization, as measured by the ratio of local and state spending to total national spending,
decreases the absolute size of government (measured by the total of government expenditure
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relative to the total GNP). Similarly, Wang, Zheng, and Zhao (2012) find that local governments
in Henan Province in China tend to spend a lower share of spending on public service after
decentralization. Busemeyer (2008) offers a more specific conclusion on the impact of
decentralization on government spending. Busemeyer (2008) finds that the impact of
decentralization on spending depends on where the services are provisioned. Decentralization is
associated with an increase in education spending, which is mainly supplied by local
governments. On the other hand, spending that is provided by the national government, such as
pension spending, is negatively associated with decentralization. Similarly, Kwon (2003) argues
the effect of decentralization on government spending should be analyzed based on its impact on
different levels of government. Kwon finds that in Korea expenditure decentralization increases
local government spending in underdeveloped area while at the same time serving as a constraint
on central government spending.
One should remember that Brennan and Buchanan’s thesis of a smaller size government
and lower spending is predicated on an assumption that there is a restraint on local governments
to tax. There is some empirical evidence that supports this notion. Fiva (2006) for example, finds
that decentralization of revenue is associated with lower spending of local government, while
expenditure decentralization is mostly associated with an increase in government spending in 18
OECD countries. Similarly, Prohl and Schneider (2009) find that the decrease in spending
depends on both taxation and spending decentralization. As a caveat, revenue decentralization
can also increase government size and spending. Kappeler, Solé-Ollé, Stephan, and Välilä 2013)
find that revenue decentralization tends to increase infrastructure spending in European
countries.
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How can we attribute the mixed result of the impact of decentralization? Let us go back
to the underlying assumptions of the theories of decentralization. First, there is an
institutionalized democracy which everybody follows. The second assumption is that local
officials are accountable to the citizens. The officials answer to the citizens, and when they are
not performing well, the citizens can protest through the necessary bureaucratic process and
replace them through elections. When the local government is not expressing the citizens’
preferences, the citizens can vote the elected government officials out of office.
An important aspect for this mechanism to work is the existence of a vibrant middle class
that so far has not been considered in the assessment of decentralization. New theories of
decentralization have indeed used assumptions from public economics that government officials
are self-interested and their goal is to stay in office. These officials have incentives to perform
well because they will be rewarded if they do so. Voters will keep them in office when these
officials are exercising the citizens’ preference. Otherwise, they will be voted out. Thus,
elections serve as an important mechanism to control the behavior of local government officials.
In sum, while it seems important, political aspects, which includes political institutions and the
voters are not considered in the process of assessing the impact of decentralization. Political
variables are mostly omitted in much of the literature on decentralization. Most decentralization
research assumes that the accountability process through the political system is working as it
should. In the current literature, the variation of the political institutions and voters are not
considered an aspect that would affect the outcome of decentralization policy.
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Political Institution, Decentralization, and Public Service Provision

Why is the theory of democracy important in assessing decentralization in developing
countries? Developing countries that are transitioning from a centralized to a decentralized
system do not have the same reason as developed countries that are transitioning under NPM.
Developed countries transitioned to a decentralized system because the centralized bureaucracy
was ineffective and inefficient, and NPM argues that the government should be divided as small
as possible to fix these problems. Developing countries often decentralized due to internal
political reasons or the push from international development agencies to reform their government
after a fall of a regime (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez & Vaillancourt, 2011).
Second, decentralization literature implicitly assumes that democracy is performing well,
particularly in the process of political accountability of local public provision as well as citizens’
engagement.
The literature of decentralization indeed has started to consider the importance of
political institutions in analyzing the impact of decentralization. Overall, this line of literature is
inspired by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Niskanen (1974) who challenge the assumption
that governments are benevolent. Thus, the study of decentralization started to include political
aspects such as existing political institutions, limits on power through democracy, privileges of
the median voter in democratization and the role of parties at the national level in sustaining
decentralization (Weingast, 2014). In developing countries, there is a possibility that the norms
and institutions that prevented the losers of the election to overthrow the winners are not present.
The power relation between central and local governments might also affect the performance of
local governments, such as in Mexico. Since the PRI controlled most of the revenue through the
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central government and provided local governments with transfers, the central government could
undermine local governments that are controlled by political opponents by withdrawing funds
from local government or reducing the transfers (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Weingast, 2003).
At the same time, existing institutions also have an influence on the success of
decentralization. For example, transfer of authority to local governments can lead to captures by
local elites when they are powerful enough to distort information about the government. In this
situation, citizens do not have control of public service provision, which instead only benefits the
elite (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Lewis, 2005).
Indeed, if we broaden the argument to include the provision of public service outside the
context of decentralization, there is more indication that political institutions have an impact on
the provision of public service. For example, the type of parties controlling the government and
party competition has an impact on the provision of public service. If party competition is higher,
public service performance is better as shown by an increase in Core Service Performance (CSP)
in cities in the United Kingdom.2 In local governments where the parties are competitive, or one
party does not have a significant advantage over the other, the local government performs much
better compared to non-competitive ones (Boyne, James, John, & Petrovsky, 2012). Foster and
Rosenzweig (2001) also find that political competition is associated with public spending. In
villages with higher political competition, public spending is directed more to services that can
be used by the majority of the public. In democratic villages, if the share of landless citizens
increases, infrastructure spending in roads increases while spending for irrigation decreases.
Beyond public service provision, if we widen the analysis again to economic performance,

2

The CSP evaluates local government performance in services areas such as primary and secondary education,
social services, environmental services, housings, libraries and management of resources.

31
Padovano and Ricciuti (2009) find that higher political competition is associated with better
economic performance since politicians are less affected by political rents.
Divisions in the society, in particular, ethnic division in the electorate, also matters in the
provision of public service. Higher ethnic division is associated with less public service
provision. According to Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) in regions where taxes are being
used to pay for services of other ethnicities the public provision is lower.
Although the literature on decentralization and public service provision, in general, has
started to include political institutions as a variable, one important factor that is often neglected is
on the side of the electorate. The literature of decentralization so far assumes that the electorate
is comprised of well-educated middle class citizens who are willing to participate in politics,
have enough knowledge on how a government should be run, and know how to keep the local
government power in check. As Lipset (1959) and other scholars argue, democracy will thrive
when there is a significant presence of an educated middle class that can oversee the government.
Democracy is sustainable only in societies with a large enough middle class that is critical and
willing to express its political and economic preferences to the government.
The Theory of Democracy and the Middle Class
What is the requirement for a democracy to perform well? If we put this in the context of
this study, what is the prerequisite for local governments to perform as envisioned by proponents
of decentralization? To be more specific, what is needed for citizens to ensure that local
governments are meeting their demands? Other than increased public participation, theoretically
decentralization is supposed to improve accountability and responsiveness of governments, in
this case, local governments that are directly serving the citizens. Governments should represent
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the policy preferences of their citizens and be responsible for the choices they make. In Romzek
and Dubnick (1987) classification of accountability, this is considered political accountability.
Citizens can punish the government when it deviates from the preference of the citizens.
Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin (1999) assert: “governments are accountable if citizens can
discern representative from unrepresentative government and can sanction them appropriately,
retaining those who perform well and ousting from office those who do not” (p. 10). Thus, local
governments have the incentive to enact policies that follow the preference of the citizens. If not,
they can be kicked out of office in the next election.
Arguably, for this to happen there should be an institutionalized or consolidated
democracy. First, democracy needs a set of rules that everyone in the system agrees upon. This
set of rules must be followed by players in the democratic system. This means that entities inside
and outside the government agree that democracy is the “only game in town” (Linz & Stepan,
1996). Linz (1990) argues, democracy is consolidated when
none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions
consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power and that no
political institutions or groups have a claim to veto the action of democratically elected
decision makers. (p. 153)
Those who win the election will uphold the power that is given to them until the next
election. In an established democratic system or a consolidated democracy, this is not a problem.
Entities most likely play by the rule of democracy.
Middle Class and Democracy

Who are the middle class citizens? The first way to identify the middle class is through a
subjective self-identification (Wright, 2003). This subjective classification is usually based on
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how individuals place themselves in the social strata. Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker (2004) argue
that “social class is a psychological attachment that is part of the individual’s overall selfconcept” (p. 470). In other words, the classification is not attached to any objective attributes, if
a person considers him or herself as a middle class, then he or she automatically belongs to that
classification. This line of argument can be traced back to Aristotle that argues
thought of classes as subjective rather than objective entities…, [it] is not determined by
any physical characteristics of any kind, such as wealth or income, or at least not
determined by such characteristics. Members of the middle class gain their position by
thinking of themselves as above the lower class and below the upper class. (Eulau, 1956,
pp. 236-237)
In other words, the middle class identity is socially constructed. It depends on a sense of
belonging of individuals to a particular class in the society (Lu, 2005).
The second way of classifying the middle class is based on an objective classification
using an economic concept such as income or occupation. The first objective classification of the
middle class is based on occupational groups such as white collar workers, private entrepreneurs
owning a small or middle-sized business, and managerial personnel (see, for example, Alford,
1962; Lu, 2005). Another way to classify the middle class is through income. Easterly (2001)
classifies the middle class as the income distribution between the 20th and 80th percentile of the
population. Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato (2000) classify the middle class as those with income
between the 75% and 125% of the population’s median income. Banerjee and Duflo (2008)
classify the middle class as individuals with income of $2-10 per day. Ravallion (2010) uses the
median of the poverty line of 70 countries and the US poverty line as the range of middle class
income of $2-13 per day. Kharas (2010) considers the middle class as individuals with $10-100
income per day.
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The theory of democracy argues that democracy requires some necessary condition on
the side of the electorate. Lipset (1959) argues that a stable democracy is associated with the
existence of middle class. In countries with a stable democracy, the citizens tend to be educated
and have a higher income. In particular, scholars such as Lipset (1959); Przeworski and Limongi
(1997) assert that there is a relationship between the economy, which ensures the presence of a
middle class, and democracy. Lipset (1959) argues that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater
the chances that it will sustain democracy” (p. 75). He asserts that from Aristotle to present day,
scholars have noted that only in a relatively wealthy nation where there are only a few
economically disadvantages citizens, can people participate in politics and “develop the selfrestraint necessary to avoid succumbing to appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (p. 75). On the
contrary, poor countries, where wealth is concentrated in a small portion of the citizens, will
have an autocratic or oligarchic system. Lipset (1959) argues that the growth of middle class
means that citizens’ ideological view will moderate and at the same time they are more willing to
accept values that are different from their own. The middle class also wants more influence in
determining their future by being more involved in policy decision-making. Civil associations
begin to grow, and through these associations citizens can discuss policies and have another
channel to voice their likes or dislikes of government actions.
In addition to being an important factor in ensuring government accountability, the
emergence of the middle class also goes along with the existence of civil organizations that are
important to the sustainability of democracy as well as the work of local governments. These
civil organizations represent what are called “civil society.” Civil society is an important force of
democracy as it serves as a space outside the state and market in which citizens can interact. A
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society with a lively civil society is said to have a “social capital” for democracy. Putnam (1993)
argues that the life of democracy depends on the “social capital” of its society. The performance
of democracy, which in turn impacts the performance of governments, depends on this civil
society. This civil society consists of micro organizations that can serve as a place for citizens to
exchange ideas, among others, on how the government should function. More importantly, it
develops trust among citizens that increases the likelihood of cooperation not only among
citizens but also between citizens and the government. When needed, these organizations can
also serve as a channel to voice concern, influence government policies, or deliver public
service. The engagement of civil society is one important factor other than public sector
entrepreneurship and modernization as well as competitive elections to explain the performance
of local government (Grindle, 2007). The civil society function is often carried out by
nongovernmental organizations or NGOs. These NGOs can assert the needs and political
demands of the citizens as well as develop innovative policies that can be used by local
governments. At the same time, the NGOs, together with the local government, can be involved
in policy formations for the citizens. Lastly, NGOs can also be involved in delivering services as
an alternative to the private sector or local government (Snavely & Desai, 2001).
The premise of decentralization is that government is closer to the citizens. Local
governments have a better understanding of people’s needs. Local governments are better able to
capture the preferences and tailor public service provisions to match these preferences. In other
words, decentralization opens the chance for citizens to better match their preferences in a
government that is closer to them compared to a centralized system. Elections serve as a
mechanism to express the preferences of the citizens. If one uses Downs (1957) approach to
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electoral systems, citizens will choose politicians who have the closest policy preference. The
politicians then would exercise the policies during their tenure; then during the next election, the
citizens can decide whether to reward and punish these elected officials. If the elected officials
are exercising the preferences of the citizens, they will elect them back into office. On the other
hand, if the elected officials are not providing services that the citizens want and need, the
citizens will choose other people that can represent them in the government.
A middle class is important in ensuring that the new authority given to the local
government through decentralization can be controlled. This is because the middle class has a
higher income and more education, which according to the literature provide two conditions that
lead to higher and more effective political participation. The first reason is that socioeconomic
status is related to cognitive political participation (Beeghley, 1986). Citizens get information
about politics through television, radio, reading magazines and newspapers and talking with
friends. Access and quality of information are related to socioeconomic status (Nie, Powell, &
Prewitt, 1969b). Even if the poor have access, their access if often limited to lower quality
information, such as television (Graber, 1976 as cited in Beeghley, 1986). The middle class with
the higher economic and intellectual resources can obtain a better quality of information; thus,
having higher cognitive participation.
The second is expressive participation (Beeghley, 1986). Expressing opinions to others
and engaging in discussions are also class related. Olsen, 1982 (as cited in Beeghley, 1986) and
Verba and Nie (1987) find that lower socioeconomic status has lower expressive participation.
This is related to the cognitive participation since the poor are exposed less to high-quality media
such as newspapers and magazines, they are less likely to be involved in discussions on politics.
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Even if they are participating, the information quality they receive is lower than other classes.
The middle class citizens have higher expressive participation because, first they have been
exposed more to higher quality political information, and second, they are actively involved in
organizations where discussions on politics happen.
Third, organizational participation is also class related. According to Olsen, 1982 (as
cited in Beeghley, 1986) and Verba and Nie (1987), the lower the class status, the lower the
organizational participation rate. Citizens need both social and economic resources to join
organizations. Often, organizations require dues that prevent some poor citizens from joining.
Furthermore, poor citizens lack resources needed to attend meetings in an organization, such as
literacy, transportation, time and decent clothing, etc. The middle class has the needed resources
and can more easily join these organizations and have discussions on politics (Beeghley 1986).
According to Beeghley (1986), the three types of participations above serve as the basis
of direct and indirect political participation. Through cognitive participation, citizens can gain
information on politics. With the information that they have, citizens can engage in discussions
(expressive participation) about policies of the government in organizations of which they are a
member. These organizations then can advocate for the interests of the members and serve as a
conduit between the government and citizens; thus, the citizens are participating indirectly in
politics.
In addition, cognitive, expressive and organizational participation also influence direct
political participation of citizens. For example, voting is also related to socioeconomic status.
Olsen, 1982 (as cited in Beeghley, 1986) and Gallego (2007) find a lower voter turnout in lower
income classes. In other words, citizens in higher socioeconomic class such as the middle class

38
have higher turnout compared to the poor. Moreover, the middle class has higher government
participation. Few citizens engage in lobbying, and these few are usually the middle and upper
class (Olsen, 1982 as cited Beeghley, 1986, Verba and Nie, 1987). In sum, middle class citizens
overall have higher participation on policy decisions of the government compared to the poor.
In the context of developing countries and Indonesia, there is also support on the premise
that socioeconomic status is related to political participation. Denton (2016), using Verba and
Nie’s (1972) framework of political participation finds that socio-economic conditions indeed
are related to the degree of political participation in 6 countries in Asia3. Using data from the
Asian Survey Barometer, she classified six types of participation into (1) interest, (2) voting, (3)
communal participation (4) parochial participation, (5) campaign, and (6) activism. Denton
(2016) finds that as citizens in Asia have higher income, they have a higher interest in politics.
Interest in this case means that they are following the news about politics and discuss political
matters with friends or families. Income is also correlated with voting, as income increases, the
tendency of citizens to vote also increases. Income is also correlated with communal
participation, which means citizens participate more in organizations as their income increases.
Fourthly, income is related to parochial participation. The higher the income of a person, the
more likely the person is to contact government officials, legislative representative, political
parties, NGOs or other influential people. If we broaden socioeconomic status to include
education, one can see more relationship between socioeconomic status and political

3

Countries include Japan, Mongolia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan. There are 7 other countries
(Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam) included in the Asian Barometer
Survey but these countries did not have the same set of questions as the six; thus, Denton only ran an analysis on
these six countries.
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participation. Income is also related to activism. Citizens with a higher income are also most
likely to become a political activist by attending demonstrations or raising or signing petitions.
In Indonesia, Denton (2016) finds socioeconomics condition to be correlated with
political participation. The higher an income of a person, the more likely they are aware of
political news. Income is also correlated with parochial participation. The higher the income of
a person, the more likely the person is to contact government officials, legislative
representatives, political parties, or NGOs. Income is also related to communal participation, the
higher the income of a person, the more likely they join organizations. Activism is also correlated
with income. The higher the income, the more likely a person is to attend demonstrations or raise
issues or sign petitions. If we broaden socio-economic status to include education, education is
also correlated with political participation specifically with communal participation, parochial
participation, and activism.
Middle Class in Developing Countries and Indonesia

Using income as a way to classify the middle class, Ravallion (2010) shows that the
middle class in developing countries is above the poverty line of $2 per day income, but it is still
well below the Western standard middle class minimum of $13 per day income. Asian
Development Bank (2010) finds the middle class in Asia mostly consists of the lower middle
class with an income of $2-$4 per day. More than half of China’s middle class and 75% of
middle class in South Asian countries (India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) falls into this
category. With the exception of Malaysia, Thailand, and Azerbaijan, the middle middle-class

40
(per day income of $4-10) in developing Asia4 constitute less than 40% of the population in each
country. The upper middle class (per day income of $10-20) only constitutes about 0.27% 5.44% of the population with an exception in Thailand and Malaysia which have 14% and 11%
of the upper middle class, respectively.
The middle class represents a significant part of the population in developing countries,
and it is an important social and political force. In sub-Saharan Africa,5 about 33% of the
population is within the middle class category. In Asia, about 56% or 1.9 billion of the
population are considered the middle class. The number is even higher in the Middle East and
North Africa6 with 86% of the population in the middle class category (Asian Development
Bank, 2010). Contrary to the poor, the middle class in developing countries no longer has to
struggle to fulfill basic needs. The middle class citizens start to spend more toward the
improvement of human capital and consumer goods, but at the same time, they are prone to
sliding back into poverty as shown by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) and Birdsall et al.
(2000). Their income is less secure compared to the middle class in developed countries. They
started to save money, but their savings are often wiped out by inflation. Fear that their children
might fall back into poverty is common among middle income families. Particularly in Asia, the
middle class families realize that their upward mobility is partly due to generous government
spending in basic human services such as education and health that accompany industrialization
(Gerke, 2002; So, 2004; van Klinken, 2014). The middle class thus tends to demand social
4

Developing Asia in the study includes Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Georgia, China, Sri Lanka,
Armenia, Philippines, Vietnam, Mongolia, Bhutan, Kirgizstan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Cambodia, India, Uzbekistan,
Lao, Nepal, Bangladesh.
5
Sub-Saharan African includes Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda.
6
Middle East and North Africa includes Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.
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protection policies and prefers government services that can help them in the process of
improving human capital such as health care and education (Asian Development Bank, 2010; So,
2004; van Klinken, 2014).
Politically, the middle class in developing countries is behaving similarly to the middle
class in developed countries. Their higher political participation contributes to a better
accountability of public services. This is because the middle class citizens are more educated and
aware of their rights and, more importantly, better organized than the poor (Asian Development
Bank, 2010; van Klinken, 2014). The channels of participation in influencing the government
have increased in developing countries, but since the usage of these channels is conditioned upon
economic resources, the middle class has an advantage in using them (Harriss, 2006; Zérah,
2009). Furthermore, the middle class is the main source of leaders in NGOs that work to ensure
accountability of the government (Asian Development Bank, 2010). The middle class is also
politically more active and more critical of the work of government with, for example, increased
activism in neighborhood associations or increased interest in local policy decision-making
(Chakrabarti, 2007).
As shown in Table 4, the middle class in Indonesia is represented by the same group as
the middle class in other developing countries. A significant portion of the population is within
the range of $2-4 income per day. A study by the Asian Development Bank (2010) shows that
those below the $2 per day poverty line represent about 53% of the population. About 36% of the
population has an income between $2-4. Eleven percent of the population has an income
between $4-10; only 1.6% have an income of $10-20.
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Table 4
Size of the Middle Class in Indonesia (Asian Development Bank, 2010)
Income
Below $2 per day
$2-4 per day
$4-10 per day
$10-20 per day

Percentage of population
53
35
11
1.6

In Indonesia, such as in other developing countries in Asia, the middle class benefited
from the expansion of public education programs from the government. The middle class can be
traced back to the expansion of education during the Dutch colonial rule in the 1900s. During
that period, the Dutch started to allow non-aristocratic families to gain access to secondary and
tertiary education. The goal was to create an educated class to fill the bureaucracy. Thus, the
development of the middle class was inter-connected with the development of bureaucracy
(Gerke, 2002). The new middle class moved upward in the social strata and replaced the
traditional aristocracy. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian government increased the
number of civil service which further increased the number of the middle class. The New Order
regime in 1965 further expanded education during three decades of power. Hence, the middle
class in Indonesia realized that it owed its upward mobility to the expansion of education from
the government. The nationalists in the pre-independence could gain political and social
advancement from the education of the Dutch government. Similarly, the new bureaucrats from
the Dutch to the New Order period gained their positions through the fact that they received
public education. The ideology that education is the key to economic success and upward
mobility led to a high attendance of schools beyond primary level of education (Gerke, 2002).
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According to Gerke (2002), the social class in Indonesia most commonly can be divided
into the absolute poor or those who can “barely make it,” the “have enough” or cukupan and the
elite rich people or orang kaya (Gerke, 2002). If we use the poverty line as a way to divide the
three categories, the absolute poor is below the poverty line, and the other two are above it (see
Table 5). Using consumption pattern to distinguish the social classes further, Gerke (2002)
modifies the classes above the absolute poor into the have enough and those who can participate
in modern consumer culture by buying goods such as motorized vehicles, electronics, branded
clothing and modern houses. This part of the society who can consume more than the have
enough, according to Gerke, is the new middle class that benefited from the expansion of
education during the New Order era. The middle class is comprised of the upper, middle and
lower-middle class. The upper middle class consists of those who can make real consumption or
those who can afford most or all modern consumer goods. While the lower and middle middle
class, according to Gerke, are the ones who are educated and have relatively prestigious jobs but
cannot fully engage in middle class consumption. The lower and middle-middle class start to
wear branded clothing, move to housing estates and eat at McDonald’s but they do not yet have
the income, for example, to travel overseas for vacation. The lower-middle and middle-middle
class citizens can be considered as a middle class based on their education and occupation.
However, they have relatively lower income compared to the upper middle class. The lowermiddle class and middle-middle class consists of middle ranking military, businessmen with
middle size companies, mid-level bureaucrats, and middle income professionals, while the upper
is comprised of upper ranking military, businessmen with large size companies, upper-level
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bureaucrats, and high income professionals. The have enough is the lower class which is
comprised of low-ranking military, owner of small businesses, low level bureaucrats.

Table 5
Classification Schemes of the Middle Class in Indonesia

Consumption
line

Poverty line

Real
consumption:
engaging in
consumption
of most
modern
goods
Symbolic
consumption:
engaging in
consumption
of some
modern
goods
Subsistence
level: above
poverty level
and engaging
in
consumption
of some
modern
goods

Mahasin’s
social class

Gerke’s
social
class
Elite

Robison’s
social
class

Upper
middleclass

High
ranking
military
Upper
military

Big
business

High
bureaucrats

High-income
professionals

Big
business

Upper
bureaucrats

High-income
professionals

Upper
middle-class

Upper
middleclass

Middle
ranking
military

Middle
business

Middleincome
professionals

Middleincome
professionals

Middlemiddle
class

Lower
middle class

Lowermiddle
class
Lower
class

Low
ranking
military

Small
business

Lower
bureaucrats

Low income
professional

Lower
middle
class

Absolute
poor

Source: Gerke (2002) with some modifications

On the other hand, Robison (1996) classifies the middle class into two sub-classes: the
upper middle class and lower middle class. The upper middle class is comprised of middle to
upper level bureaucrats, middle to upper level professionals, NGO activists, and intellectuals
which grew in size along with the rise of the New Order regime. The lower middle class,
according to Robinson, is often neglected and under-researched but it is influential in political
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changes and demanding a more liberal transformation and accountability of the government.
This lower middle class is comprised of low level civil employees, private sector clerks and
teachers, small businessmen and small landowners.
Mahasin (1990) divides the middle class into three categories. The upper-middle class of
Mahasin is a more refined division of the upper middle class of Robison. Instead of lumping
together technocrats and bureaucrats working in governmental agencies with professionals
outside the government, he divides the groups into two. The technocrats and bureaucrats occupy
the upper middle class while the professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and managers
occupy the middle middle-class. Lower level civil servants and petty businessmen are a part of
the lower middle class.
Table 5 captures the classification schemes based on Gerke, Mahasin and Robison’s
description. Robinson and Mahasin do not discuss in detail the class above the upper middle
class nor do they mention whether there is a class above it. Some of the characteristics of the
upper middle class discussed by Robison and Mahasin such as the fact that the upper middle
class citizens are higher level bureaucrats who were part of the student movement in 1996
suggests that these are actually “elites” since many became ministers during the New Order era.
Hence, I draw the dotted lines between the upper middle class and an empty space above it. This
space is similar to the Gerke’s “elites.” However, Robinson also mentions the resentment of the
middle class against the intrusive nature of the state, pervasive corruption within the government
and arrogance of government officials. This is similar to the characteristics of middle-middle
class and lower-middle class suggested by Gerke. Thus, the Robison and Mahasin upper middle
class is perhaps equal to the entire middle class in Gerke’s classification.
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This study defines the middle class as objectively determined based on an economic
concept. The classification of the middle class is based on income. The first reason for using
income is that this study will analyze the influence of the middle class on decentralization based
on the assumption that the middle class has certain characteristics of political participation. The
literature on middle class political participation asserts that the middle class is participating more
in politics due to the material resources that provide the middle class access to direct or indirect
political participation. Using a subjective classification will give an invalid indicator since selfidentification or belief of being a middle class does not guarantee the existence of material and
political resources enabling an individual to participate in politics.
The second reason of using income to classify the middle class is to avoid any bias from
the cross-regional incomparability of some other economic concepts. For example, if we use
Lu’s (2005) classification of the middle class based on occupation such as managerial personnel.
What is managerial personnel? Is a manager in a multinational corporation in the capital city
comparable to a manager in a small company of 20 employees? Another example is if we use
entrepreneurs owning a small or middle-sized business. What is considered a small or middlesized business? Classifying the two occupations will require another economic measurement,
such as the size of assets or sales of a particular business or company, which is also comparable
to income as a monetary unit. Using income to classify the middle class will reduce the
complication that is present in other measures and at the same time provide an indicator that is
suitable for the purpose of this study. Furthermore, the research by Verba and Nie (1987),
Beeghley (1986) and Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969a) also suggest income to be a consistent
predictor of political participation across regions.
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Local Government Performance, Mayors, and Elections
The literature suggests that government performance has an impact on government
officials’ turnover (Boyne, James, John, and Petrovsky (2009); Fiorina (1978, 1981); Kousser
(2004); McCabe, Feiock, Clingermayer, and Stream (2008). This line of argument suggests that
rather than voting based on any ideological position under a Downsian theory, citizens vote
retrospectively. They punish government officials if the citizens feel that the government is
performing poorly by voting the officials out of office. Conversely, the citizens reward the
officials if they are performing well by reelecting these officials back into office. These studies
typically use economic indicators such as economic growth, debt or government deficit as an
indicator to gauge the performance of the government at the national level (Fiorina, 1981);
Kousser (2004) or at the local level (Brender, 2003; McCabe et al., 2008). Recent studies have
used other measures such as achievement in education (Berry & Howell, 2007), the quality of
public infrastructure (Hiskey & Seligson, 2003) or an existing service performance index (Boyne
et al., 2009, 2012).
On the other hand, intrinsic characteristics of mayors, such as their political affiliations,
education, and work experience in the public sector have an impact on local government
performance (Avellaneda, 2009b, 2012, 2016; Petrovsky & Avellaneda, 2014). Avellaneda
(2009b) finds that as mayors’ experience and education increase, school enrollment in
Colombian cities increases. Political and organizational context also affect mayors’ performance.
Political connection with high ranking party officials, the size of public organizations, and
quality of managers in the mayor’s office improve the ability of mayors to generate revenue
(Petrovsky & Avellaneda, 2014).
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This study analyzes the relationship between local government performance and political
turnover. The performance of a city in this study will be measured by two indicators: school
enrollment rate, and quality of roads. As previously mentioned, the current middle class in
Indonesia could come out of poverty through a government sponsored education that was started
in the 1980s. Citizens, especially parents, are concerned with the availability of public schools
since it determines where their children can continue their next level of education to stay in the
middle class group. There has been a long held belief among Indonesians that most, if not all the
best schools in every level of education are public schools.
Thus, school enrollment rate is arguably one indicator of success or failure of educational
policies at the local level to which local governments are accountable. Considering the fact that
the middle class in Indonesia realizes that they owe their status now from the expansion of public
education provided by the government, school enrollment rate is even more important to citizens
in this economic class.
As another indicator, the quality of infrastructure such as roads is crucial to the citizens
since it affects, for example, trade flows (Wilson, Mann, & Otsuki, 2003), economic growth
(Fedderke, Perkins, & Luiz, 2006), and access to public health services (Banerjee, Deaton, &
Duflo, 2004). Additionally, the quality of roads in terms smoothness of streets and how well
roads are maintained is one of the main concerns of citizens. Roads are one of the basic public
services provided by the municipalities that are visible to all citizens; jolts from potholes and the
rough surface of roads can create an economic cost for road users coming from the repair cost for
automobiles (Van Ryzin, 2008) or extra time needed to pass through roads with uneven surfaces.
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It is fair to assume from Robison and Gerke’s research that the middle class citizens are
the ones who care more about the quality of the roads compared to the poor. The middle class
has motorbikes or cars, thus will be more likely bothered by low-quality roads compared to the
poor. Thus, cities with a larger size of the middle class should be more reactive to changes in the
quality of roads.
This study will analyze both mayoral and city council elections to see whether the
performance of a city, as measured by the improvement in the quality of roads or school
enrollment rates have an impact on the probability of these local officials getting reelected. If a
city does not improve its quality of roads or school enrollment rate, there is a greater chance that
mayors and city councils will be voted out of office when they run for reelections. The middle
class with the social and economic resources have higher participation in politics. Presumably,
the material and political resources of the middle class will have more influence over political
turnover when there is a change in local government performance. If local governments are
performing poorly in maintaining or improving the quality of roads and school enrollment rate,
municipalities with a larger size of the middle class should be more reactive in punishing the
government officials. Local officials should have a smaller chance of being reelected when
performing poorly in a municipality with a sizable middle class.
Research Questions

This study develops a theory of decentralization that includes the theory of democracy, in
particular, the theory of the middle class. In achieving this, this study plans to use Indonesia as
an object of study. The variance of decentralization’s impact in Indonesian cities will provide a
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rich dataset for developing and testing theories on decentralization that includes the current
theory that is based on economics and public administration, and also political theories.
The higher education and financial resources of the middle class serve as social capital
for political engagement in a decentralized system. The literature suggests that these factors also
are correlated with higher direct and indirect political participation. Thus, the first research
question in the context of decentralization: what is the influence of the middle class on local
government expenditures for education and infrastructure? The second question is: will the
presence of a middle class be reflected in the variation of political turnover in different
municipalities?
Hypotheses
The literature suggests that decentralization of expenditure without decentralization of
taxation is more likely to increase local government spending. This is the case in Indonesia.
Local governments are given the power to spend with limited power to generate revenue. Most
of the funding for local governments come from intergovernmental transfers. It is reasonable to
expect that direct election will increase education and infrastructure spending. This is because
the self-maximizer mayors are not constrained by increasing tax revenue to fund their spending.
As a self-maximizer, mayors will try to spend more on public services to get herself re-elected.
The literature also suggests that the higher education and financial resources of the
middle class serve as a social capital for political engagement in a decentralized system. The
middle class will have higher cognitive, expressive and organizational participation in politics.
The higher cognitive, expressive and organizational participation serve as the basis for direct and
indirect participation. Thus, municipalities with a significant presence of the middle class should
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be more responsive to the demands of the citizens in a decentralized system. Municipalities with
a significant presence of the middle class should have a different pattern of spending compared
to municipalities that have less middle class.
The middle class in developing countries benefited from the expansion of education from
the government. The upward mobility of the middle class was due to public education provided
by the government. At the same time, these middle class citizens in developing countries are still
dependent on government services to maintain their level of living and ensure that their children
do not return to poverty. Similarly, it is expected that the middle class will be demanding a better
quality of roads since this class will be owning vehicles such as motorcycles and cars. The
quality of roads will be important to the middle class. Thus, this study hypothesizes:
H1a: Local government spending on education is higher after decentralization.
H1b: The effect of decentralization on education spending is stronger when there is a
strong presence of the middle class.
H2a: Local government spending on infrastructure is higher after decentralization.
H2b: The effect of decentralization on infrastructure spending is stronger when there is a
strong presence of the middle class.
The literature also suggests that the middle class citizens, with the political resources they
have, are more responsive to changes in local government performance. Not only the middle
class will demand more, but the middle class will also have a higher cognitive participation to
understand and evaluate local government decisions. The middle class also tends to vote more,
participate in organizations or attend demonstrations. In short, the middle class is politically
active, directly or indirectly. Thus, the combination of higher cognitive participation, higher
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voting rate and higher other indirect political participations of the middle class should matter
when there are changes in local government performance. Municipalities with a significant
presence of the middle class should be more responsive to the changes in local government
performance. Thus, this study hypothesizes:
H3a: In a decentralized system, mayors that are performing well will be voted back into
office in a reelection.
H3b: The effect of good performance on the likelihood of mayors being voted back into
office is stronger when the middle class is present.
H4a: In a decentralized system, the city council’s incumbent party in local governments
that are performing well will be voted back into office in a reelection.
H4b: The effect of good performance on the likelihood of the city council’s incumbent
party in local governments being voted back into office is stronger when the
middle class is present.
The emergence of the middle class is usually accompanied by the growing civil
organizations, ensuring democracy is working well. In the context of decentralization, these civil
organizations can supposedly ensure local governments are responsive to the demands of the
society and held accountable for their decisions. Citizens, through these organizations, can voice
their concerns and influence local government decision-making. Thus, citizens should have more
influence in the decision-making of local governments in cities where civil organizations exist.
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is no reliable quantitative data available on these
civil organizations that would enable researchers to conduct a cross municipality comparison.
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Thus, the study explores the relationships between NGOs and decentralization qualitatively
without hypothesizing any directional relationship:
H5: Civil society organizations have a role in enhancing citizens’ participation in local
government decision-making.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

This study uses the 2001 implementation of decentralization policies in Indonesia to
examine the relationship between the middle class and decentralization over time and space. In
particular, the study will concentrate on the effect of the establishment of direct elections on the
variation of educational spending, infrastructure spending and political turnover across 508
municipalities from 2001 to 2013. The unit of analysis is cities. The analysis of how the middle
class affects the relationship between decentralization and government spending is conducted
using a panel regression approach. However, due to data availability, the analysis of the
relationship between local government performance and political turnover utilizes cross sectional
regressions.
Theoretical insights from the theory of democracy and decentralization suggest that local
governments should be more responsive in cities where there is a significant presence of the
middle class. Using education and infrastructure as a proxy for the demand of the middle class,
we should expect that educational and infrastructure expenditures of local governments to be
higher in municipalities with a significant presence of the middle class. At the same time, we
should expect that the middle class will be more critical of the performance of local
governments, thus in cities where the middle class is present, political turnover will be more
likely to happen if local governments are not performing well.
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To test the hypotheses, this study intended to employ a mixed method approach or
triangulation that utilizes both quantitative and qualitative approaches. As suggested by
Lieberman (2005), Smith (1997), Denzin (1978) and Riccucci (2010) the use of the two methods
complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses to increase the validity of the research
findings. Mixed method combines a large-N statistical analysis with an in-depth analysis of cases
from the sample. The quantitative part gives us a robust analysis on the direction and magnitude
of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. It gives us a general
pattern of the relationship between the variables based on the statistical numbers (Smith 1997).
This method allows us to see the effects of causes or the average effect of the independent
variable on the dependent variable. The robust quantitative results then should guide us to
conduct an analysis on the causes of effects or the causal mechanism in which the independent
variables affect the dependent variable. In particular, this study planned to conduct in-depth
interviews with government officials and NGO activists to see how the middle class affects
government spending after decentralization in six cities of diverse cases based on Seawright and
Gerring’s (2008) techniques on case selections. However, due to limitation in the variance of
informants, the qualitative section falls short of providing a rigorous case study that could
explain the causal mechanism in which the middle class affects local government spending and
political turnover in these six cities. Instead, the qualitative section focuses on the role of the
middle class and NGOs in ensuring accountability of local government in a decentralized era.
The first quantitative approach uses panel regression models to see the impact of the
presence of the middle class in cities after decentralization on educational and infrastructure
spending. The implementation of direct election in 2005 provides the chance to analyze the pre
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and post effects of decentralization in a quasi-natural experiment setting. The pre condition is the
period before direct election of mayors started in 2005, while the post condition began in 2005
when cities had direct mayoral elections. For this purpose, the study uses a dummy variable that
is coded 1 for the years when cities started to have direct mayoral elections and 0 otherwise.
Contrary to a difference in difference model that analyzes the interaction between two dummy
variables, this study uses a continuous middle class variable as the treatment variable that
represents the different proportion of the middle class population in cities. The middle class
variable moderates the relationship between the pre and post direct election variable and local
government spending. To analyze the moderation effect of the middle class on the relationship
between the direct election of mayors and local government spending, this study uses a panel
regression that includes several control variables to take into account other factors that influence
local government spending after decentralization. In particular, the model focuses on the
interaction between the implementation of the direct election and the middle class variable. In
short, the panel regression models analyzes whether the size of the middle class in cities
amplifies the effect of the implementation of direct mayoral election on local government
spending.
To test hypothesis 1, the study uses a panel regression model with a dependent variable of
local government expenditure in primary and secondary education (Educ Expenditure). Model 1
will use a panel regression to see the impact of the implementation of the direct mayoral election
on education spending. i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, where i refers to each municipality and t denotes year.
The focus of the model is on how the relationship between direct mayoral election and education
spending is affected by the size of the middle class in a city.

57
Education Spending and the Middle Class
Model 1:
EducExpit= f (Directit, MiddleClassit, PolCompit, GDPit, Childit,
CapitalCityit, Jawait, Urbanit, Directit x MiddleClassit)
EducExp: local government spending in education
Direct: direct election dummy
MiddleClass: size of the middle class
PolComp: measure of political competition
GDP: local gross domestic product
Child: school age population
CapitalCity: provincial capital dummy
Jawa: Java island dummy
Urban: size of population in urban area
Direct x MiddleClass: direct election x size of the middle class
To test hypothesis 2, the study uses a panel regression model with a dependent variable of
local government expenditure in infrastructure (InfraExp). Model 2 will use a panel regression to
see the impact of the establishment of direct mayoral election on infrastructure spending. i = 1,
2, 3, .., n, where i refers to each municipality and t denotes year. The focus of this model is on
how the relationship between the establishment of direct mayoral election and infrastructure
spending is affected the size of the middle class in a city.
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Model 2:
InfraExp= f (Directit, MiddleClass, PoliticalCompit, GDPit, Areait, Jawait,
CapitalCityit, Urbanit, Populationit, Directit x MiddleClassit)
InfraExp: local government spending in infrastructure
Direct: direct election dummy
MiddleClass: size of the middle class
PolComp: measure of political competition
GDP: local gross domestic product
Population: population
CapitalCity: provincial capital dummy
Jawa: Java island dummy
Urban: size of population in urban area
Direct x MiddleClass: direct election x size of the middle class
To analyze political turnover, I used several cross-sectional regression models with two
dependent variables: the percentage change of share of votes of mayors running in a reelection
and the percentage change of share of votes of an incumbent party in two consecutive elections.
The change in the percentage of paved roads and school enrollment rates are proxies for local
government performance. In particular, the model analyzes how the relationship between local
government performance proxies and votes of incumbents is affected by the size of the middle
class.
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Model 3 analyzes the impact of school enrollment rate as a proxy for local government
performance in education and party votes. The model analyzes the impact of the change in
enrollment rates on the changes in the incumbent party’s share of votes in two consecutive
elections. The model also analyzes how the middle class variable moderates the relationship
between enrollment rates and the share of votes of the incumbent party.
Model 3:
PartyVotesi = f(Middle Classi , EnrollRatei, EffPartiesi, Employmenti, GDPi, Middle
Classi x EnrollRatei)
PartyVotes: changes in votes of an incumbent party in two consecutive elections
EnrollRate: changes in school enrollment rate
MiddleClass: size of middle class
EffParties: changes in effective number of parties
GDP: changes in local gross domestic product
Employment: changes in local employment rate
Population: population
EnrollRate x MiddleClass: changes in enrollment rate x size of the middle class
Model 4 analyzes the impact of school enrollment rate as a proxy for local government
performance in education and mayoral votes. The model analyzes the impact of the change in
enrollment rates on the change of the share of votes received by mayors running for a reelection.
Additionally, the model analyzes how the middle class variable moderates the relationship
between enrollment rates and the share of votes of the incumbent mayor.
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Model 4:
MayorVotesi = f(Middle Classi , EnrollRatei, EffPartiesi, Employmenti, GDPi, Middle
Classi x EnrollRatei)
MayorVotes: changes in share of votes of mayors running for a reelection
EnrollRate: changes in school enrollment rate
MiddleClass: size of the middle class
EffParties: changes in effective number of parties
GDP: changes in local gross domestic product
Employment: changes in local employment rate
Population: population
EnrollRate x Middle Class: changes in enrollment rate x size of middle class
Model 5 analyzes the impact of paved roads as a proxy for local government performance
in infrastructure and party votes. The model analyzes the impact of the percentage change of
total paved road in cities on the changes of the incumbent party’s share of votes in two
consecutive elections. In addition to that, the model analyzes how the middle class variable
moderates the relationship between the percentage of paved roads and the share of votes of the
incumbent party.
Model 5:
PartyVotesi = f(Middle Classi , PavedRoadi, EffPartiesi, Employmenti, GDPi, Populationi
Middle Classi x PavedRoadi)
PartyVotes: changes in share of votes of incumbent party in two consecutive elections
PavedRoad: changes in percentage of paved roads
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MiddleClass: size of middle class
EffParties: changes in effective number of parties
GDP: changes in local gross domestic product
Employment: changes in local employment rate
Population: population
PavedRoad x Middle Class: percentage change in paved roads x size of the middle class
The qualitative approach is used to complement the findings from the statistical analysis.
It concentrates on analyzing the causal mechanism of how the middle class is influencing local
government decision-making through process tracing (Mahoney, 2012). For this purpose, I
conducted interviews with several local government officials and NGO activists who specialize
in local government finance, education, and community empowerment. Ideally, based on
Seawright and Gerring (2008) classification on cases, the cases should be drawn from
observations with extreme values (low and high) as well as observations with the median value
of the middle class variable. Due to limited funding, I conducted interviews only in two
provinces in Java: West Java and Banten. Selected interviewees are chosen based on pragmatic
reasons, mainly accessibility and availability of funds to travel to meet the interviewees. In total,
I interviewed one former official at the Ministry of Finance who specializes in local government
taxation, 3 local government officials and 9 NGO activists. This set of interviews with local
government officials resulted cases that represent high values of the middle class variables; while
interviews with NGO activists resulted in all values of the middle class variables. Questions I
used for the interviews can be found in Appendix A.
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Data and Variables
Middle Class and Government Spending
Education Spending (Dependent Variable)
In this study, educational spending is used as one proxy for the demand of the middle
class. As the literature suggests, the middle class with its social resources will have more
influence over policy decisions of local government compared to the poor. At the same time, the
literature also suggests education to be an interest of the middle class in developing countries,
especially in Indonesia. Education spending of local governments includes expenditure on
primary and secondary education in which local governments have a significant authority.
Ideally, to get a more sensitive indicator for education spending, we should use three education
spending numbers: primary education, secondary education and primary plus secondary
education. However, the only data available are total education spending which combines
primary plus secondary education. The education spending data are available from the Indonesia
Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER). The database is compiled by the
World Bank with data from various government agencies in Indonesia. The education spending
data originated from the Ministry of Finance and is available from 2001 to 2013.
In the analysis, education spending data is adjusted for inflation using 2005 as a base
year. Table 6 shows that the average education spending per city in one year is 141 billion rupiah
or about $17 million. The minimum is 54 million rupiah or about $ 6,686 in Yapen Island, a
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small municipality in Papua province, while the maximum is 941 billion rupiah or about $116
million in Bandung district.7

Table 6
Education and Infrastructure Spending per City (in thousand Indonesian Rupiah)
Variables
Education
spending
Infrastructur
e spending

n

Mean

Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

Skewnes
s

Kurtosis

4,612

140,900,00
0

54,190

941,100,000

108,300,000

1.89

8.49

4,505

62,460,000

212,200

677,200,000

58,850,000

3.583

23.02

Source: author’s estimation using INDO-DAPOER data

Infrastructure Spending (Dependent Variable)
Infrastructure spending is used as another proxy for the demand of the middle class. We
should expect that the middle class with its social resources will have more influence over policy
decisions of local government compared to the poor. At the same time, the middle class will pay
more attention to the quality of roads since middle citizens will be more likely to own vehicles
and directly affected by the quality of roads when they drive motorcycles or cars. Data on
infrastructure spending on roads is not available. The infrastructure spending serves as the
closest proxy for spending on roads. The infrastructure spending data again are obtained from
INDO-DAPOER. Infrastructure spending is adjusted for inflation using 2005 as a base year. The
mean infrastructure spending is about 62.5 billion rupiah or $ 8.1 million. The minimum

7

This study is using the number of school age population as an independent variable. To put the figures into a
different perspective, the average education spending per student is 1.6 million rupiah or about $200. The minimum
is 100,000 rupiah (about $12.5) while the maximum is about 10 million rupiah or about $1270 per student.
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infrastructure spending is 212 million rupiah in Tulang Bawang district while the maximum is
677.2 billion rupiah in Siak district of Riau province.
The Middle Class (Independent Variable)
This study uses six classifications of the middle class. Each classification is needed in the
models to check for robustness. The first classification (mid1) is based on a relative concept of
the middle class. In this classification, I operationalized the middle class as citizens between the
20th and 80th percentile of the national income distribution as suggested by Easterly. The
distribution of the 20th and 80th percentile allows us to capture the middle class based solely on
how people are placed in the income distribution. The middle class consists of citizens who are
in the middle 60% of the income distribution, from the 20th to the 80th percentile. The bottom
20% and the upper 20% of the income distribution are not considered the middle class. For every
city, this study calculates the percentage of citizens in each city with an income between the 20th
and 80th percentile of the income distribution of all Indonesian citizens.
The percentage of the middle class in each city is calculated from the Indonesian National
Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) which was initiated in the early 1960s. Susenas is a survey that
includes about 65,000 to 265,000 respondents yearly. The stratified random sampling of the
Susenas surveys is designed to be representative down to the municipality level. For this study,
this variable is calculated from Susenas 2001 to Susenas 2014.
1

20

80

100%

i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, i refers to each municipality and t denotes year.
As Figure 3 illustrates, suppose the calculation of the 20-80th percentile of the income
distribution at the national level resulted in the range of income of $1-4. Thus, an individual with

65
an income of $1-4 is considered the middle class in this study. The study then calculated the
proportion of the population in a city that falls between the income range of $1-4. In Figure 3, in
City A, 50% of the population in the city has an income of $1-4 (the 20-80th percentile of the
national income distribution); in other words, 50% of the population is considered the middle
class. The middle class variable has a value of 0.5. Similarly, in City C, 70% of the population in

Percentage of population based on national
income distribution

the city falls between $1 and $4 per day. Thus the middle class variable has a value of 0.7

100%

1%

Middle Class in Cities
13%

90%

10%

10%
10%

80%
70%

50%

33%

60%

70%

50%
40%

80%

30%
20%

49%

54%

10%

20%

0%
City A
0 ‐ 20th percentile

City B

City C

20th‐80th percentile (Middle Class)

City D
80th‐100th percentile

Figure 3. Middle class in cities based on the 20-80th percentile standard.

The minimum for mid1 is 3.89%; this means that only about 4% of the population of this
city is within the 20-80th percentile of the national income distribution. The maximum for mid1
is about 97% indicating that in this particular city 97% of the population is between the 20-80th
percentile of the national income distribution. The median of mid1 is 61%; which along with the
skewness show that the distribution is slightly not normal.
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The second classification of the middle class (mid2) uses a combination of the absolute
and relative classifications. One the one hand, mid2 is based on the relative classification of the
20th-80th percentile of the income distribution at the national level in Indonesia (similar to mid1).
However, a study from Asian Development Bank ([ADB],2010) indicates that the abovementioned scale also includes Indonesian citizens below the $2 per day income. According to
ADB’s (2010) study, the $2 per day poverty line in Indonesia is at the 53rd percentile. Therefore,
this study modifies the range of income distribution to exclude those below the $2 per day
poverty line. mid2 is operationalized as citizens with an income between the 55th and 80th
percentile of the income distribution at the national level in Indonesia. For every city, this study
calculates the percentage of citizens in each city with an income between the 55th and 80th
percentile of the income distribution of all Indonesian citizens.
55

2

80

100%

As shown in Table 7, there is at least one city that does not have any citizens within the
55-80% of the national income distribution. While the mean of the middle class population
within the 55-80% is about 24%. The maximum for mid2 is 64% which indicates that the 64% of
the population of that particular city has an income between 55-80% of the national income
distribution.
The third classification of the middle class (mid3) uses an absolute classification based on
the range of $2 to $10 per day income suggested by Banerjee and Duflo (2008). The literature
indicates that this range of income captures the characteristics of the middle class in developing
countries such as having a higher consumption level, a relatively more stable job, and higher
education compared to the poor.
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Table 7
Size of the Middle Class
Variables
Percentage of
population 20th-80th
percentile (mid1)
Percentage of
population 55th-80th
percentile (mid2)
Percentage of
population $2-$10
(mid3)
Percentage of
population $2-$4
(mid4)
Percentage of
population $4-$6
(mid5)
Percentage of
population $6-$10
(mid6)

n

Mean

Min

Max

Standard Skewness
Deviation

Kurtosis

5,478

60.50%

3.89%

97.40%

0.13

-0.84

3.97

5,478

23.70%

0.00%

63.70%

0.11

0.05

2.56

5,478

40.80%

0.00%

96.90%

0.23

0.30

2.02

5,478

31.10%

0.00%

82.40%

15.30%

0.11

2.18

5,478

6.83%

0.00%

50.20%

6.78%

1.50

5.24

5,478

2.95%

0.00%

29.90%

4.07%

2.38

9.59

Source: author’s estimation using SUSENAS data

3

$2

$10

100%

i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, i refers to each municipality and t denotes year.
The third middle class variable, mid3, has a mean of 41%. This means on average
population between the $2-10 is about 30%. However, the variation is quite high; there is a city
with 0% of the population within the $2-10 income range while there are several cities with more
than 97% of the population with $2-10 income.
Last, to get a more sensitive measure of the middle class using the absolute approach, the
classification of middle class using the $2-10 per day standard is divided further into three subclassifications to capture the lower middle-class, middle middle-class and upper middle-class
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divisions. This sub-classification is a modification based on the social strata by Mahasin (1990),
Robison (1996) and Gerke (2002) in Table 8. Thus, the $2-4 per day income is an
operationalization of the lower middle-class. The middle middle-class is operationalized as
citizens with an income between $4-6 per person per day, while the upper middle-class is
represented by $6-10 income per person per day.

Table 8
Classification Schemes and Income of the Middle Class in Indonesia
Mahasin’s
social class

Consumption
line

Poverty line

Real
consumption:
engaging in
consumption
of most
modern goods
Symbolic
consumption:
engaging in
consumption
of some
modern goods

High
ranking
military
Upper
military

Big
business

High
bureaucrats

High-income
professionals

Big
business

Upper
bureaucrats

High-income
professionals

Upper
middle-class

Middle
ranking
military

Middle
business

Middleincome
professionals

Middleincome
professionals

Subsistence
level: above
poverty level
and engaging
in consumption
of some
modern goods

Low
ranking
military

Gerke’s
social
class
Elite

Robison’s
social
class

Upper
middleclass
Middlemiddle
class

Upper
middleclass

Income
Above
$10
$6-10
$4-6

Lowermiddle
class
Small
business

Lower
bureaucrats

Low income
professional

Lower
middle class

Lower
class

Absolute
poor

Lower
middle
class

$2-4

<$2

Source: Gerke (2002) with some modifications

The fourth middle class variable (mid4) that captures the percentage of citizens within the
$2-4 income range has a mean of 31% with a minimum of 0. A zero means that none of the
city’s population are within the $2-4 income range. The maximum for mid4 is 82.4%. The fifth
middle class variable (mid5) captures the income range of $4-6. The mean is 6%, meaning that
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on average only 6% population of cities have an income between $4-6. As the previous variable,
there are cities that do not have any citizen within between $4-6 income range. The maximum is
50%. The sixth middle class variable (mid6) captures the proportion of the upper middle-class
population in a city. The mean is 2% meaning on average only 2% of the population of cities in
Indonesia have an income between $6-10. The range of this variable is narrower compared to the
two previous variables (minimum 0 to maximum 30%).
Direct election
This study analyzes the impact of direct mayoral elections as one of the features of local
government decentralization. Direct election was started in 2005. However, it was not
implemented simultaneously. Mayors, who were previously elected by the city council, were
given a chance to finish their term. Only about 150 municipalities had their first direct election in
2005. The rest of the cities started their direct election in 2006, 2007 or 2008. The variable
(direct) is a dummy variable which is coded one for years when a city started to have a direct
election. For example, in the city of Bandung, the direct election was first held in 2008. Thus, the
city is coded zero to 2007 and starting 2008 onward the city is coded 1.
Control Variables
School age population. In Indonesia, the school age is from 7 to 18 years old. The school
age population in this study is the number of children from 7 to 18 years old in each city from
2001 to 2013. The school age population data come from Susenas. The average school age
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population is 124,492 children. The minimum is 3,439 in Supiori district, Papua province, while
the maximum is 1.3 million in Bogor district.
Municipal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP in constant price is used as a control
variable. This logic is that richer cities are more likely to spend more compared to poor cities.
The average GDP is 3.8 trillion rupiah or about $470 million. The GDP ranges from 38 billion
rupiah in Nduga district in Papua to 125 trillion rupiah in Central Jakarta. The GDP data are also
from INDO-DAPOER database. As other variables in monetary values, GDP is divided by the
2005 constant price to adjust for inflation.
Effective number of parties. Another control variable for local government spending is
political competition. Political competition in the city council is measured using the effective
number of parties index from Laakso and Taagepera (1979).
1
∑

100%

The effective number of parties shows the ‘real’ or ‘important’ parties competing in an election.
It essence it shows the concentration of votes among parties competing in an election. The
number should be close to the actual total of parties competing in an election if the parties
receive the same share of votes. On the other hand, if the number is close to 1 the votes are
concentrated in one party. In the 2004 election, there are 24 parties competing in city council
elections across Indonesia. The effective number of parties shows that on average the votes are
concentrated among 7.6 parties. In the 2009 election, there are 38 parties (44 parties in Aceh
province) competing in city council elections. However, the mean effective number of parties is
12.11. This means that on average votes are concentrated in 12 parties. The effective number of
parties is constant for five years between elections. Thus, the effective number of parties based

71
on the 2004 city council election is also used in 2005-2008. Similarly, the effective number of
parties based on the 2009 city council election is also used in 2010-2013. The effective number
of parties of the city council ranges from 1.7 to 28.4. A 1.7 effective number of parties means
that there are approximately 2 parties that control the city council based on the number of votes.
This means that the city has low political competition. An effective number of 28.4 means that
there are 28 parties in the city council meaning that the city has a high political competition.
Percentage of people in urban area (urban) . The urban data comes from SUSENAS. The
variable is calculated based on the number of people of a municipality living in an urban area
divided by the total population of a municipality as shown by the formula below.
100%
The maximum is 100% meaning that all population in that particular municipality live in the
urban area. On the other hand, the minimum is 0%. This means that all population in that
particular municipality live in a rural area. The mean is 37%.
Capital city. The study also includes a control variable for the 33 provincial capital cities.
The dummy variable is coded 1 for provincial capitals and 0 for other cities. This variable is to
control for the possibility that provincial capitals have higher education spending because of
their status as the center of province’s activities.
Land size. The total land size of cities is available from INDO-DAPOER. This mean land
size is 4,374 km2. The smallest municipality in terms of land size is Magelang city in Central
Java (16.06 km2) while the municipality with the largest land size is Malinau district in East
Kalimantan with a total area of 42,621 km2 of land area.
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Main islands dummy variable. Indonesia is comprised of thousands of small islands and 5
main islands: Sumatera, Jawa or Java, Kalimantan or Borneo, Sulawesi and Papua. The main
island variable is a dummy variable that controls for the unobserved characteristics of the islands
that affect the dependent variables in this study. For each island, I create a dummy variable of 1
if a city is located on an island and 0 otherwise. For example, I coded 1 for Medan city for the
Sumatera variable because the city is located in Sumatera. Thus, for other island variables,
Medan is coded 0.
The control variables are summarized in Table 9.

Table 9
Control Variables
Variables
GDP in constant
price (thousand
rupiah)

n

Mean

6,086 3,810,000

Min

38,307

Max

Standard
Deviation

125,000,000 8,611,000

Skewness Kurtosis

6.54

58.65

Percentage of People
in Urban Area
School age
population 7-18 years
old

5,478

37.40%

0%

100%

32%

0.88

2.40

5,453

124,492

3,439

1,337,000

135,333

2.77

14.75

Effective number of
parties

4,053

9.81

1.71

28.45

4.55

1.13

4.32

Population

5,328

524,560

12,249

5,198,000

573,737

2.45

11.64

Total area

3,530

4,374

16

42,621

6,429

2.96

13.30

Source: Author’s estimation using INDO-DAPOER and Susenas data. GDP is in Indonesian Rupiah; Total area is in
square kilometer.
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Local Government Performance and Political Turnover
Political Turnover (Dependent Variable)
For the first variable of political turnover, this study is utilizing the 2004 and 2009 city
council elections as one dependent variable. This study will analyze the change in the incumbent
party’s share of votes in two consecutive elections. To do this, I compare the 2009 share of votes
of the 2004-2009 city council’s incumbent party to the party’s share of votes in the 2004
election. I compare the party’s share of votes when the party is defending its seats in the 2009
election to the share of votes the party got in the 2004 election. A decrease in the share of votes
means that the incumbent party is being punished by the voters, while an increase means that the
party is being rewarded for their work in running a local government. Data of the 2004 and 2009
city council elections are available from the National Election Commission.

i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, i refers to each municipality and 2009 denotes the 2009 election, and
2004 denotes the 2004 election.
On average the change in the incumbent party’s share of votes in the 2009 election is 11%. In other words, the 2004 winner in city council elections, on average, received about 11%
fewer share of votes in the 2009 city council election. The minimum is -41% in Timor Tengah
Selatan district. This means that in this municipality, the winner of the 2004 election received
41% fewer share of votes in the 2009 election. The maximum is 76% in Cimahi city which
means that the winner of the 2004 election received 76% more share of votes in the 2009
election.
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The second dependent variable to measure political turnover comes from the direct
mayoral elections which started in 2005. The study analyzes the change in the share of votes of a
mayor running for a reelection. For example, the share of votes obtained by a mayor who is
running for a reelection in 2010 in City A is compared to the share of votes the mayor got during
his first election in 2005. The data on mayoral elections are mostly available from the National
Election Commission and People’s Voter Education Network. The dataset on mayoral elections
are then complemented by data from city-level election commission websites as well as national
and local newspapers. Based on the availability of the key independent variables, this study
includes mayoral elections that took place in 2005-2013.

i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, i refers to each municipality and t denotes year.
The average change in share of votes for a mayor running for a reelection is -4%. This
means that on average, mayors running for reelection receive about 4% fewer share of votes. The
minimum is -65.6% in Tulungagung district in the 2013 election, which shows that the
incumbent mayor receives 65% fewer share of votes in 2013 compared to when he/she ran in the
2008 election. The maximum is 55% in Lampung Barat district in the 2012 election. This means
that the mayor received 55% more share of votes compared to the mayor’s election in 2007.
Table 10 summarizes the change in shares of votes.
School Enrollment Rate
This study uses school enrollment rates for elementary, middle and high school in
municipalities as a proxy for local government performance. School enrollment rate data are

75
Table 10
Changes in Share of Votes of Mayors and Incumbent Party in City Councils
Variables
Delta percentage
votes of majority
party of 2004 in 2009
election
Delta percentage
votes of mayor
running in a reelection

n

Mean

Min

Max

Standard Skewness
Deviation

Kurtosis

390

-11%

-41%

77%

0.10

2.1

21.2

300

-5%

-66%

55%

0.21

-0.2

3.3

Source: author’s estimation using INDO-DAPOER and Susenas data

taken from INDO-DAPOER. An elementary school enrollment rate of 100% means all children
who are within the elementary school age are enrolled in elementary school, while a 0% means.
that none of the elementary school age population is in elementary school. On average the
enrollment rate for high school is 46.97%, while the max is 87.85. The data also shows there are
municipalities in the Papua province such as Nduga and Pegunungan Bintang with 0 students
enrolled in high school. The average enrollment rate for middle school is 65.85%, while the
maximum is 95% and the minimum is 1.14%. Last, the average enrollment rate for elementary
school is 92.57% with a maximum of 100%. However, Nduga district has an enrollment rate of
6.6%, which is far below the national average
For the analysis, the study calculates the difference between the enrollment rate of one
year before the election and the enrollment rate of two years before the election. If t represents
the election year, the enrollment rate used is enrollment rate t-1 minus enrollment rate t-2. The
reason is that the school enrollment rate report is usually published in December. Thus, the latest
enrollment rates available for the public during an election in year t is enrollment rate t-1. As
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literature in retrospective voting suggests, most voters use the most recent indicator to evaluate
the performance of governments (for example, see Berry and Howell, 2007; Boyne et al., 2009,
2012). Thus, the comparison between the most recent data to the year before is used in this
study. The descriptive statistics of the enrollment rates t-1 minus enrollment rates t-2 for each
level of school is shown in Table 11.

Table 11
Net School Enrollment Rate
Variables

n

Net Enrollment Ratio:
High school

4,549

Mean
%
47.0

Min
%
0.0

Max
%
87.9

Standard Skewness
Deviation
0.14
-0.29

Kurtosis

Net Enrollment Ratio:
Middle school

4,553

65.9

1.1

95.7

0.12

-1.34

6.35

Net Enrollment Ratio:
Elementary school

4,553

92.6

6.6

100.0

0.07

-6.04

56.14

Delta Enrollment
Ratio: High school

349

1.9

-26.2

40.9

0.09

0.31

4.50

Delta Enrollment
Ratio: Middle school

349

1.1

-23.8

26.9

0.08

0.09

3.84

Delta Enrollment
Ratio: Elementary
school

349

0.2

-15.8

15.6

0.04

-0.28

4.68

2.88

Source: Author’s estimation using INDO-DAPOER data

Percentage of Paved Roads
The second proxy for local government performance is the percentage of roads paved
with asphalt. The data are available from the INDO-DAPOER. For the range of years used in this
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study, data on paved road are available for the years of 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2011. On average
about 65% of roads in cities in Indonesia are paved with some cities having 100% of their roads
paved. However, there are cities with less than 1% of paved roads (see Table 12).
Ideally, just as I operationalized the local government performance proxy for education, I
should calculate the difference between the percentage of paved road one year before the election
and the percentage of paved road two years before the election. For example, for the city council
election in 2009, I should use paved road data of 2008 and 2007. Since the data for paved roads
are only available for the years mentioned earlier, I use the closest year of available data. Thus,
for the city council election in 2009, I calculate the difference of percentage of paved road in
cities between 2008 and 2005. If t represents the election year, the paved road data used are
paved road t-1 minus paved road t-4.

Table 12
Percentage of Paved Roads
Variables

n

Villages with road:
Asphalt (in % of
total villages)

1,365

Mean
%
64.8

Delta Villages with
road: Asphalt (in %
of total villages)

346

7.8

Min
%
0.8

Max
%
100.0

-35.7

48.0

Source: Author’s estimation using INDO-DAPOER data

Standard Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
0.28
-0.41
2.04

0.13

0.41

3.61
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Delta Effective Number of Parties and Effective Number of Candidates
The number of political parties competing in city council elections in Indonesia is
different in 2004 and 2009. Arguably, more parties competing in an election means that the votes
are more likely to be spread out among the parties. Thus, to control for changes in the incumbent
party’s share of votes that is due to the changes in the number of parties competing in the city
council elections, I use the delta in the number of effective parties competing in the 2004 and
2009. If t represents the 2009 election, the delta effective number of parties used is t minus the
delta effective number of parties t-5.
Similarly, it is possible that a mayor is facing a different number of opponents in the two
elections he or she ran. Thus, this study controls for the change in the number of effective
candidates competing in the two elections. If t represents the election year, the delta effective
number of candidates used is the delta effective number of candidates t minus the delta effective
number of candidates t-5. (See Table 13.)

Table 13
Changes in Effective Number of Parties and Candidates
Variables

n

Mean

Min

Max

Delta Effective
Number of
Candidates

301

-0.05

-3.97

4.22

Delta Effective
Number of Parties

395

4.52

-9.80

17.64

Source: Author’s estimation using Election Commission data

Standard Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
1.22
0.01
3.40

4.28

0.44

3.79
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Employment Rate
As another control variable, this study uses the change in the employment rate. The data
are available from the Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER).
For the analysis, the study calculates the difference between the employment rate one year before
the election and the employment rate two years before the election. If t represents the election
year, the employment rate used is employment rate t-1 minus employment rate t-2. The descriptive
statistics of the delta employment rates are shown in Table 14.

Table 14
Employment Rate
Variables
Employment rate
Delta Employment rate

n

Mean Min Max Standard Skewness Kurtosis
%
%
%
Deviation
3,673 93.5 77.9 100.0
0.04
-0.84
3.56
349

0.3

Source: Author’s estimation using INDO-DAPOER data

-9.5

8.4

0.02

-0.02

5.57

CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
This chapter is structured as follows. In part 1, I report panel regressions to reveal the
impact of the establishment of direct election on education and infrastructure spending. In part 2,
I analyze the relationship between local government performance and political turnover. In part
3, I discuss further the importance of the middle class in influencing local government spending
and political turnover.
Middle Class and Government Spending
Education Spending and the Middle Class
H1a: Local government spending on education is higher after decentralization.
H1b: The effect of decentralization on education spending is stronger when there is a
significant presence of the middle class.
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, the study uses several panel regressions with a dependent
variable of local government expenditure in primary and secondary education (EducExp). The
regressions test the relationship between the establishment of direct mayoral election and
education spending. Second, they test whether the impact of the establishment of direct mayoral
election on education spending is amplified by the size of the middle class in a city.
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Model 1:
EducExpit= f (Directit, MiddleClassit, PolCompit, GDPit, Childit,
CapitalCityit, Jawait, Urbanit, Directit x MiddleClassit)
To analyze the relationship between education spending and direct election, I report both
fixed effect and random effect panel regressions using six different classifications of the middle
class. First, I report the baseline model in a fixed effect panel regression to see the impact of
direct election on education spending without any interaction effect. Table 15 shows that the
direct election variable is positive and significant. Direct election increases education spending
about 42 billion rupiah. The other variables such as PolComp, GDP, Child and Urban are
mostly significant and have a positive effect on education spending.
Second, I report six fixed effect panel regressions that include the interaction between the
middle class variables and direct election in Table 15. From the six models, we can see that the
interaction effect is significant in Model 1.3 and Model 1.5. Figure 4 shows that the relationship
between direct election and education spending is amplified as the size of the middle class in a
city increases. For Model 1.3, Figure 4 shows that after direct election, a-45 percentage point
increase (from mid2=0.25 to mid2=0.7) in the size of the middle class in a city increases
education spending as much as 25 billion rupiah. To put it differently, after direct election, a one
percentage point increase in the size of the middle class within the 55th-80th percentile of the
national income distribution will increase education spending as much as 0.55 billion rupiah or
about $42,000. For Model 1.5, the graph shows that after direct election, a 45-percentage point
increase (from mid4=0.15 to mid4=0.6) in the size of the middle class in a city increases
education spending as much as 50 billion rupiah. In other words, after direct election, a one
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percentage point increase in the size of the middle class within the $2-4 income range will
increase education spending as much as 0.9 billion rupiah ($69,000).

Table 15
Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results - Education Spending (DV)
Independent
Variables

Model 1.1

Model 1.2

Model 1.3

Model 1.4

Model 1.5

Model 1.6

Model 1.7

Effective number
of parties

4.793***
(0.476)
137.5***
(30.71)

4.783***
(0.473)
138.2***
(30.96)

4.350***
(0.500)
135.6***
(30.47)

2.170***
(0.429)
98.21***
(28.63)

3.382***
(0.486)
115.8***
(29.73)

3.336***
(0.429)
116.1***
(29.30)

3.690***
(0.421)
124.2***
(29.85)

0.0127***
(0.00472)
0.000234*
(0.000124)
42.42***
(4.211)

0.0127***
(0.00473)
0.000233*
(0.000124)
52.40***
(18.76)
-4.221
(27.38)

0.0125***
(0.00468)
0.000221*
(0.000124)
25.77***
(5.252)

0.0117***
(0.00450)
0.000235**
(0.000119)
21.48***
(5.469)

0.0123***
(0.00471)
0.000256**
(0.000122)
22.70***
(5.539)

0.0119***
(0.00442)
0.000183
(0.000118)
30.98***
(3.643)

0.0112**
(0.00437)
0.000169
(0.000118)
33.57***
(3.459)

Percentage of
People in Urban
Area
GDP in constant
price
School age
population 7-18
Direct election
mid1

-20.69
(20.00)

mid2

101.1***
(21.40)

mid3

62.20**
(28.95)

mid4

174.0**
(87.05)

mid5

263.0
(171.9)

mid6
-16.27
(27.20)

mid1*direct

78.01***
(23.64)

mid2*direct

31.91
(21.69)

mid3*direct

54.12**
(27.15)

mid4*direct

132.5
(91.82)

mid5*direct
mid6*direct
Constant
N
R-squared
Clusters

-48.63**
(20.04)
3,123
0.380
421

-46.00*
(26.34)
3,123
0.381
421

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-37.04*
(21.74)
3,123
0.386
421

-39.11*
(21.76)
3,123
0.428
421

-45.75**
(22.22)
3,123
0.403
421

-25.85
(21.21)
3,123
0.412
421

276.4
(188.1)
-24.66
(20.97)
3,123
0.413
421
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Figure 4. Impact of middle class and direct election interaction on education spending.

Model 1.2 to Model 1.7 indicate that, ceteris paribus, an increase in one child aged 7-18
in a city increases education spending about 170,000 to 250,000 rupiah. PolComp variable is also
significant in all models. An increase in one point of effective number of parties, ceteris paribus,
increases the number of education spending ranging from 2.2 to 4.7 billion rupiah. The models
also show that an increase in one percentage point of population that lives in urban areas
increases education spending about 98 billion to 138 billion rupiah. Richer cities tend to spend
more on education. Ceteris paribus, an increase in one billion rupiah in GDP will increase
education spending about 12 million rupiah. Overall, the independent variables in the fixed effect
models explain about 38 to 43% of the variance of education spending.
Arguably, the fixed effect approach is the safest approach in panel regression since it
controls for omitted variable bias. The fixed effect approach controls for unobserved timeinvariant characteristics that are excluded in the model. However, by doing this, we are
neglecting the possibilities that the differences across the cities are affecting the variation in the
dependent variable.
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Thus, to see whether there is any time-invariant effect in the relationship between
education spending and the independent variables, I also analyze the data using random effect
models. First, I report the baseline model in a random effect panel regression to see the impact of
direct election on education spending without any interaction effect. The baseline model (Model
1.8) in Table 16 indicates that the establishment of direct election increases education spending
about 54 billion rupiah. Similar to the fixed effect baseline models, the relationship of other
variables such as effective number of parties, GDP, the percentage of people in urban area and
school age population have a positive and significant effect on education spending.
Then, I report six random effect panel regressions with the interaction between the
middle class variables and direct election. The random effect approach in Table 16 indicates that
the interaction effect of the middle class and direct election is significant at 95% significance
level or less in 5 out of 6 models. It has to be noted that more variables in the random effect
models will be significant since the models have more degree of freedom compared to the fixed
effect models. In other words, the standard errors of the variables in the models are smaller,
making it more likely for variables to be significant. However, the random effect models do
show that there are time-invariant characteristics that affect the dependent variable. First of all,
the jawa variable is significant. This means that based on models 1.9 to 1.14, on average, cities
in Java island tend to spend 58 to 68 billion rupiah more than cities in other islands. What is
interesting is that the urban variable becomes less important. Compared to the fixed effect
models in which the urban variable is significant in all models, the variable is only significant at
p<0.05 in two models and the sign is reversed. One can speculate that this is because the urban
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Table 16
Random Effect Panel Regression Results - Education Spending (DV)
Independent
Variables
Effective
number of
parties
Percentage
of People in
Urban Area
GDP in
constant
price
School age
population 718
Direct
election

Model 1.8

Model 1.9

Model 1.10

Model 1.11

Model 1.12

Model 1.13

Model 1.14

4.282***
(0.423)

4.270***
(0.423)

3.929***
(0.439)

2.585***
(0.387)

3.285***
(0.398)

3.294***
(0.402)

3.522***
(0.405)

-0.355
(12.58)

-0.442
(12.47)

-6.640
(12.54)

-39.82***
(11.71)

-23.23*
(12.25)

-23.06**
(11.22)

-18.31
(11.46)

0.00682***
(0.00193)

0.00661***
(0.00191)

0.00589***
(0.00185)

0.00631***
(0.00188)

0.00621***
(0.00187)

0.00594***
(0.00185)

0.000379***
(6.60e-05)
59.54***
(17.65)
15.65
(26.00)

0.000382***
(6.54e-05)
31.45***
(5.021)

0.000401***
(6.73e-05)
27.00***
(5.419)

0.000393***
(6.67e-05)
27.16***
(5.555)

0.000389***
(6.57e-05)
40.24***
(3.550)

0.000393***
(6.51e-05)
43.53***
(3.216)

0.00684***
(0.00194)
0.000379***
(6.60e-05)
53.94***
(3.343)

mid1

-39.74**
(18.46)

mid2

62.74***
(22.23)

mid3

31.65
(27.52)

mid4

92.16
(91.84)

mid5

149.3
(180.7)

mid6
-9.067
(26.44)

mid1*direct

102.4***
(21.59)

mid2*direct

53.21***
(19.96)

mid3*direct

80.70***
(24.78)

mid4*direct

188.6**
(87.32)

mid5*direct

Constant

58.50***
(9.921)
33.14***
(11.12)
-17.11**
(6.966)

58.49***
(9.904)
34.23***
(11.45)
-26.61
(16.57)

60.58***
(9.869)
35.00***
(11.12)
-2.833
(8.792)

67.91***
(9.960)
31.47***
(11.32)
-9.406
(9.507)

64.53***
(9.983)
37.36***
(11.13)
-10.40
(9.703)

64.33***
(9.789)
27.28**
(11.76)
-4.559
(7.699)

361.0**
(183.0)
62.28***
(9.848)
22.39*
(11.66)
-5.247
(7.429)

n
R-squared
Clusters

3,123
0.6158
421

3,123
0.6169
421

3,123
0.6219
421

3,123
0.6298
421

3,123
0.6282
421

3,123
0.6248
421

3,123
0.6258
421

mid6*direct
jawa
Provincial
capital

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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variable in the fixed effect models is absorbing the effect of the time-invariant variables that
were excluded from the model.
PolComp variable stays significant. An increase in one point of effective number of
parties, ceteris paribus, increases the amount of education spending ranging from 2.6 to 4.3
billion rupiah. CapitalCity is also affecting education spending. On average, provincial cities
spend about 22 to 37 billion rupiah more than other municipalities.
In sum, in both fixed effect and random effect models, the presence of the middle class
especially those within the $2-4 per day income seems to have an impact in increasing education
spending when interacted with direct election.
Infrastructure Spending and the Middle Class
H2a: Local government spending on infrastructure is higher after decentralization
H2b: The effect of decentralization on infrastructure spending is stronger when there is a
strong presence of the middle class.
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, the study uses several panel regressions with a dependent
variable of local government expenditure in infrastructure (Infra Expenditure). The regressions
test the relationship between the establishment of direct mayoral election and infrastructure
spending. Second, it tests whether the impact of the establishment of direct mayoral election on
infrastructure spending is moderated by the size of the middle class in a city.
Model 2:
InfraExp= f (Directit, MiddleClass, PoliticalCompit, GDPit, Areait, Jawait,
CapitalCityit, Urbanit, Populationit, Directit x MiddleClassit)
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As in the education spending model, I report both fixed effect and random effect panel
regressions using 6 different classifications of the middle class. First, I calculate the baseline
model in a fixed effect panel regression to see the impact of direct election on infrastructure
spending without any interaction effect. Table 17 shows that direct election has a positive impact
on infrastructure spending. The baseline model 2.1 shows that the establishment of direct
election increases infrastructure spending as much as 20 billion rupiah, ceteris paribus.
Second, I analyze six fixed effect panel regressions that include the interaction between
the middle class variables and direct election. From Table 17, the only interaction term that is
significant is in the model using mid2. Figure 5 shows that the establishment of direct mayoral
election in cities is moderated by the size of the middle class. In particular, that after direct
election, a 50-percentage point increase (from mid2=0.2 to mid2=0.7) in the middle class within
the 55-80th percentile of the national income population decreases infrastructure spending as
much as 20 billion rupiah. In other words, a 1-percentage point increase in the size of the middle
class within the $2-3 income range decreases infrastructure spending as much as 0.1 billion
rupiah or about $77,000.
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Figure 5. Impact of middle class and direct election interaction on infrastructure spending.
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Table 17
Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results - Infrastructure Spending (DV)
Independent
Variables
Effective number
of parties
Percentage of
People in Urban
Area
GDP in constant
price

Model 2.1

Model 2.2

Model 2.3

Model 2.4

Model 2.5

Model 2.6

Model 2.7

0.208
(0.325)
62.42
(43.03)

0.189
(0.328)
63.31
(43.28)

0.871**
(0.391)
63.31
(44.00)

-1.120**
(0.468)
41.84
(41.38)

-0.500
(0.467)
49.56
(41.79)

-0.719*
(0.384)
50.12
(41.97)

-0.422
(0.353)
53.41
(43.06)

Population

0.00693**
(0.00339)
5.38e-05*
(3.01e-05)

0.00701**
(0.00333)
5.34e-05*
(3.00e-05)

0.00589*
(0.00341)
5.64e-05*
(2.94e-05)

0.00562*
(0.00331)
4.68e-05*
(2.74e-05)

0.00619*
(0.00338)
4.84e-05*
(2.78e-05)

0.00573*
(0.00333)
5.09e-05*
(2.91e-05)

0.00601*
(0.00337)
5.30e-05*
(3.02e-05)

Area

-0.00140
(0.000869)

-0.00138
(0.000888)

-0.00134
(0.000848)

-0.000866
(0.000814)

-0.00103
(0.000826)

-0.00121
(0.000832)

-0.00137
(0.000870)

Direct election

20.12***
(3.021)

18.62
(11.48)
35.88
(25.12)

0.0139
(4.787)

16.58***
(4.168)

13.78***
(4.762)

20.98***
(3.076)

21.02***
(2.988)

mid1

-114.2***
(15.06)

mid2

53.12***
(18.03)

mid3

26.14
(20.87)

mid4

247.4***
(80.40)

mid5

470.7***
(177.9)

mid6
2.506
(17.18)

mid1*direct

74.00***
(19.84)

mid2*direct

2.193
(14.34)

mid3*direct

19.81
(19.40)

mid4*direct

-81.72
(63.86)

mid5*direct

Constant

-15.23
(27.40)

-37.59
(30.66)

8.483
(26.20)

-6.918
(25.73)

-7.633
(25.79)

-7.489
(26.69)

-196.0
(135.4)
-9.346
(27.44)

n
R-squared
Clusters

2,047
0.114
411

2,047
0.118
411

2,047
0.136
411

2,047
0.131
411

2,047
0.123
411

2,047
0.130
411

2,047
0.127
411

mid6*direct

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Population is also only significant at a p<0.1 level across Model 2.2 to 2.7. An additional
one person in a city increases infrastructure spending about 46,000 to 56,000 rupiah, ceteris
paribus. The GDP variable is significant all models. In short, the variable shows that an increase
in one billion rupiah of GDP increases infrastructure spending about 4.6 – 5.6 million rupiah.
The effect of PolComp on infrastructure spending is inconclusive. PolComp is only significant at
p<0.05 in two models and the relationship is positive in one model and negative in the other.
What is interesting is that the total size of land area does not seem to affect infrastructure
spending. The area variable is not significant and negative in all models.
In sum, although we see a relationship between infrastructure spending and the
interaction effect of the middle class and direct election, the relationship of other independent
variables such as area gives us a reason to be suspicious about the validity of using a fixed effect
model. Although the result of a Hausman test indicates that a fixed effect model is preferable to a
random effect, the result of the random effect models in Table 18 gives an indication that the
fixed effect is omitting time-invariant characteristics of the independent variables that are
affecting infrastructure spending.
Next, I report the baseline model in a random effect panel regression to see the impact of
direct election on infrastructure spending without any interaction effect. The baseline model,
Model 2.8, indicates that on average cities increase about 23 billion rupiah of their infrastructure
spending due to direct election. Last, I report six random effect panel regressions with the
interaction between the middle class variables and direct election in Table 18. In the random
effect models, we see that the interaction term is only significant in the model using mid2
(middle class between 55-80% of the national income distribution). At first glance, after adding
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Table 18
Random Effect Panel Regression Results - Infrastructure Spending (DV)
Independent
Variables
Effective
number of
parties
Percentage of
People in Urban
Area
GDP in constant
price
Population
Area
Direct election

Model 2.8

Model 2.9

Model 2.10

Model 2.11

Model 2.12

Model 2.13

Model 2.14

0.505*
(0.281)

0.500*
(0.283)

0.764**
(0.315)

-0.722**
(0.340)

-0.293
(0.357)

-0.333
(0.301)

-0.0405
(0.283)

18.91*
(10.50)

18.99*
(10.62)

26.06**
(10.58)

-5.592
(9.788)

3.506
(10.60)

1.735
(9.423)

7.342
(9.749)

0.00573***
(0.00135)
7.60e-06
(8.81e-06)
0.00394***
(0.000734)
23.32***
(2.225)

0.00579***
(0.00135)
7.13e-06
(8.88e-06)
0.00393***
(0.000739)
23.12**
(10.17)
17.70
(17.86)

0.00572***
(0.00134)
7.55e-06
(8.77e-06)
0.00401***
(0.000738)
3.066
(4.131)

0.00493***
(0.00130)
1.16e-05
(8.42e-06)
0.00375***
(0.000678)
17.62***
(3.640)

0.00531***
(0.00132)
9.66e-06
(8.60e-06)
0.00383***
(0.000694)
15.02***
(4.170)

0.00500***
(0.00131)
1.12e-05
(8.43e-06)
0.00380***
(0.000697)
23.08***
(2.610)

0.00512***
(0.00131)
1.06e-05
(8.65e-06)
0.00382***
(0.000721)
23.23***
(2.448)

mid1

-96.56***
(14.02)

mid2

59.14***
(14.24)

mid3

40.70**
(17.25)

mid4

263.6***
(69.46)

mid5

447.0***
(164.9)

mid6
0.333
(15.99)

mid1*direct

78.93***
(19.52)

mid2*direct

3.975
(12.99)

mid3*direct

21.60
(17.88)

mid4*direct

-78.82
(57.89)

mid5*direct

Constant

-20.13***
(6.512)
-20.16**
(8.989)
12.09**
(6.077)

-20.19***
(6.590)
-18.20*
(9.507)
1.192
(12.29)

-20.75***
(6.468)
-20.55**
(9.056)
30.58***
(6.218)

-16.28***
(6.055)
-22.66***
(8.745)
14.09**
(5.703)

-17.10***
(6.247)
-19.17**
(8.681)
14.03**
(5.716)

-18.22***
(6.103)
-26.56***
(9.161)
16.77***
(5.699)

-156.2
(132.2)
-19.81***
(6.306)
-26.58***
(9.431)
16.58***
(5.926)

n
R-squared
Clusters

2,047
0.34
411

2,047
0.33
411

2,047
0.34
411

2,047
0.36
411

2,047
0..35
411

2,047
0.36
411

2,047
0.35
411

mid6*direct
jawa
Provincial
capital

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

91
time-invariant variables such as jawa and capitalcity, we can see that area has a positive and
significant relationship with infrastructure spending. An increase in the total size of land area
increases infrastructure spending. The models show that on average, an increase in one square
kilometer of land size increases infrastructure spending as much as 3.8 – 4 million rupiah, ceteris
paribus. Other variables are also showing an expected relationship with the dependent variable.
For example, an increase in one billion rupiah of GDP, ceteris paribus, increases infrastructure
spending about 6 to 6.6 million rupiah.
What is interesting is that the jawa variable is negative and significant across the random
effect models. This means that after controlling for other factors, cities in Java are spending less
money on infrastructure than cities outside of Java. On average, cities outside of Java spend
about 16 to 20 billion rupiah more compared to cities in Java. This perhaps can be attributed to
the fact that Java is a saturated island. It is populated by 60% of the total 240 million population
of Indonesia while its size is only 7% of the total land size of Indonesia. CapitalCity is also
negative. Perhaps it is fair to argue that CapitalCity is also negative since these are urban areas in
which the development of new roads and other infrastructure is well advanced compared to other
areas that are still building new roads.
In sum, both the fixed and random effect models show that the effect of the establishment
of direct election is moderated by an increase in the percentage of middle class citizens in a city,
especially those who are in the $2-3 income bracket. An increase in infrastructure spending due
to the establishment of direct election is attenuated by the increase in the size of the middle class
between the $2-3 income range. Perhaps this phenomenon should be analyzed in tandem with the
increase in education spending. If we look back at the education spending models, the significant
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middle class variable is also the $2-3 and $2-4 per day income middle class, or the lower middle
class. It is fair to argue that the overall increase in education spending in cities where there is a
large number of citizens within the $2-3 and $2-4 income bracket has to be funded one way or
another. One way is to sacrifice infrastructure spending. The effort of local governments to
increase education spending in cities where there is a higher number of the lower middle class is
perhaps offset by a decrease in infrastructure spending.
Further analyses on other types of government spending indeed give support to this
notion. Local governments must offset an increase in one type of spending with a decrease in
another type of spending. I conducted five panel regressions using social protection, agricultural,
economic development, housing and personnel expenditures as dependent variables. For the key
independent variables, I used mid2 and mid4 or the middle class between $2-3 and $2-4. Overall,
direct election increases almost all types of expenditures. However, the interaction between
direct election and the middle class variable is significant in models with dependent variables:
social protection, agricultural, economic development, and personnel spending (see Figure 6 and
Appendix B for the complete regression results). The impact of direct election on personnel
spending and social spending is amplified by an increase in the size of the middle class. In other
words, as the size of the middle class becomes larger, personnel spending and social spending
when direct election was established also increases. On the other hand, the impact of direct
election on agricultural spending and economic development spending is attenuated by the size
of the middle class. Thus, an increase in the size of the middle class is reducing agricultural
spending and economic development spending.
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Figure 6. Impact of middle class and direct election on expenditures.

Local Government Performance and Political Turnover
H3a: In a decentralized system, mayors that are performing well will be voted back into
office in a reelection.
H3b: The effect of good performance on the likelihood of mayors being voted back into
office is stronger when the middle class is present.
H4a: In a decentralized system, the city council’s incumbent party in local governments
that are performing well will be voted back into office in a reelection.
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H4b: The effect of good performance on the likelihood of the city council’s incumbent
party in local governments being voted back into office is stronger when the
middle class is present.
To analyze the relationship between local government performance and political
turnover, this study uses three cross-sectional regression models to analyze the relationship
between local government performance and the changes in the percentage of votes received by
incumbents running for a reelection.
Local Government Performance in Education and
Political Turnover in City Councils
The first model analyzes the impact of school enrollment rates—as a proxy of local
government performance in education—and party votes. The dependent variable is
operationalized as the difference between the 2009 election share of votes of a party that won the
largest share of votes in the 2004 city council election and the share of votes that the party
obtained in the 2004 city council election. There are three enrollment rates used as the
independent variable: elementary school enrollment rate, middle school enrollment rate and high
school enrollment rate.
Model 3:
PartyVotesi = f (Middle Classi , EnrollRatei, EffPartiesi, Employmenti, GDPi, Middle
Classi x EnrollRatei)
In total, I conducted three baseline models with the independent variables of elementary school
enrollment rate, middle school enrollment rate and high school enrollment rate as well as 18
regressions on all six middle class variables and three school enrollment indicators (elementary,
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middle, and high schools). The baseline models in Tables 19, 20, and 21 (Models 3.1, 3.8, 3.15)
show that the changes in enrollment rate of elementary school have an impact on the changes in
votes of the incumbent party that is running for a reelection. This means the incumbent party is
gaining more share of votes if elementary school enrollment rate increases. In other words,
voters are rewarding the incumbent party in the city council if there is an improvement in local
government service.
Model 3.1 shows that an increase in one percent of elementary school enrollment rate
increases the share of votes of the incumbent party as much as 0.754 percentage point. To put
this into perspective, suppose a party gained 20% of the total votes or let us say 20,000 votes
from the total of 100,000 votes in the 2004 city council election. An increase in one percent of
enrollment rate increases their share of votes to about 20.754% or 20,754 votes. The number of
city council seats for a city with a population between 100,000 and 200,000 is 25 seats. A seat
then is equal to about 4,000 votes. Thus, although the one percentage increase in elementary
enrollment rate seems trivial, the difference of 754 votes could very well increase the chance of
the party to gain more seats in the city council.
Employment rate does not have an impact on votes. Effective number of parties is
showing the expected sign and significant for all models. If there is an increase of effective
number of parties, it is expected that votes will be more spread out among the parties thus votes
for the incumbent party is lower when effective number of parties increases.
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Table 19
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta share of Votes of Incumbent Party (DV) and
Elementary School Enrollment Rate (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta elementary
school
enrollment

Model 3.1

Model 3.2

Model 3.3

Model 3.4

Model 3.5

Model 3.6

Model 3.7

0.00753*
(0.00425)

0.0225***
(0.00226)

0.0136*
(0.00698)

0.0158***
(0.00605)

0.0172***
(0.00520)

0.00975
(0.00638)

0.00956
(0.00591)

0.0160
(0.0355)

mid1

0.0499
(0.0319)

mid2

0.0252
(0.0204)

mid3

0.0391
(0.0257)

mid4

0.0192
(0.0638)

mid5
mid6
mid1*enrollment
rate
mid2*enrollment
rate
mid3*enrollment
rate
mid4*enrollment
rate
mid5*enrollment
rate
mid6*enrollment
rate
Delta effective
number of
parties
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

0.0598
(0.0987)
-0.0362***
(0.00537)
-0.0283
(0.0248)
-0.0177*
(0.0101)
-0.0307**
(0.0131)
-0.0208
(0.0342)

0.160
(0.421)
-0.0786***
(0.0178)

0.00949***
(0.00143)
-0.000619
(0.00499)
-1.73e08***
(6.50e-09)
0.168
(0.429)
-0.0799***
(0.0161)

0.00993***
(0.00147)
-0.000283
(0.00504)
-1.93e08***
(6.64e-09)
0.180
(0.412)
-0.0631***
(0.0140)

389
0.228

389
0.232

389
0.216

389
0.216

0.00960***
(0.00142)
-0.000418
(0.00499)
-1.81e08***
(6.47e-09)
0.148
(0.422)
-0.0760***
(0.0143)

0.00944***
(0.00146)
-0.000972
(0.00498)
-1.67e-08**
(6.66e-09)

Constant

0.000223
(0.00510)
-2.08e08***
(6.71e-09)
0.175
(0.432)
-0.0589***
(0.0110)

0.00970***
(0.00140)
-0.000323
(0.00495)
-1.90e08***
(6.41e-09)
0.196
(0.432)
-0.0707***
(0.0239)

n
R-squared

389
0.213

389
0.249

389
0.223

Delta
employment rate

-0.0101***
(0.00147)

-0.0512
(0.0718)
0.00989***
(0.00150)
-0.000401
(0.00504)
-1.95e08***
(6.51e-09)
0.162
(0.425)
-0.0633***
(0.0130)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 20
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta share of Votes of Incumbent Party (DV) and
Middle School Enrollment Rate (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta middle
school
enrollment

Model 3.8

Model 3.9

Model 3.10

Model 3.11

Model 3.12

Model 3.13

Model 3.14

0.000198
(0.000698)

-0.00107
(0.00292)

-0.00191
(0.00158)

-0.00319*
(0.00185)

-0.00274
(0.00188)

-0.000982
(0.00106)

-0.000858
(0.00101)

-0.0288
(0.0560)

mid1

0.0290
(0.0416)

mid2

0.00460
(0.0264)

mid3

0.0150
(0.0355)

mid4

-0.00618
(0.0648)

mid5
mid6
mid1*enrollment
rate
mid2*enrollment
rate
mid3*enrollment
rate
mid4*enrollment
rate
mid5*enrollment
rate
mid6*enrollment
rate
Delta effective
number of
parties
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

0.00622
(0.106)
0.00203
(0.00480)
0.00786
(0.00533)
0.00621**
(0.00310)
0.00725*
(0.00437)
0.0117
(0.00748)
-0.0103***
(0.00161)

-0.0102***
(0.00160)

-0.0101***
(0.00167)

-0.0102***
(0.00175)

-0.0101***
(0.00169)

-0.0104***
(0.00169)

0.0260*
(0.0150)
-0.0103***
(0.00171)

Constant

-0.000450
(0.00525)
-2.08e08***
(7.41e-09)
0.132
(0.429)
-0.0562***
(0.0128)

-0.000541
(0.00519)
-2.04e08***
(7.16e-09)
0.131
(0.429)
-0.0389
(0.0404)

-0.000762
(0.00530)
-2.01e08**
(7.91e-09)
0.117
(0.421)
-0.0652***
(0.0205)

-0.000279
(0.00528)
-2.17e08***
(8.28e-09)
0.149
(0.422)
-0.0587**
(0.0245)

-0.000624
(0.00530)
-2.06e08**
(8.10e-09)
0.143
(0.428)
-0.0632***
(0.0240)

5.47e-05
(0.00529)
-2.18e08***
(7.82e-09)
0.141
(0.417)
-0.0548***
(0.0169)

-0.000186
(0.00523)
-2.18e08***
(7.63e-09)
0.122
(0.425)
-0.0558***
(0.0158)

n
R-squared

389
0.188

389
0.189

389
0.192

389
0.193

389
0.192

389
0.191

389
0.191

Delta
employment rate

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta share of Votes of Incumbent Party (DV) and
High School Enrollment Rate (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta high
school
enrollment

Model 3.15

Model 3.16

Model 3.17

Model 3.18

Model 3.19

Model 3.20

Model 3.21

0.000138
(0.000834)

0.00203
(0.00439)

-0.000418
(0.00175)

0.00139
(0.00238)

0.00146
(0.00231)

0.000170
(0.00109)

0.000496
(0.00110)

-0.0323
(0.0576)

mid1

0.0268
(0.0413)

mid2

0.00467
(0.0266)

mid3

0.0117
(0.0355)

mid4

-0.0166
(0.0668)

mid5
mid6
mid1*enrollment
rate
mid2*enrollment
rate
mid3*enrollment
rate
mid4*enrollment
rate
mid5*enrollment
rate
mid6*enrollment
rate
Delta effective
number of
parties
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

-0.00275
(0.115)
-0.00317
(0.00676)
0.00188
(0.00574)
-0.00203
(0.00364)
-0.00302
(0.00482)
-0.000399
(0.00704)
-0.0103***
(0.00163)

-0.0103***
(0.00162)

-0.0101***
(0.00170)

-0.0102***
(0.00177)

-0.0102***
(0.00173)

-0.0103***
(0.00170)

-0.00701
(0.0129)
-0.0103***
(0.00172)

Constant

-0.000533
(0.00533)
-2.06e08***
(7.20e-09)
0.134
(0.432)
-0.0563***
(0.0127)

-0.000683
(0.00535)
-2.04e08***
(6.99e-09)
0.123
(0.432)
-0.0365
(0.0417)

-0.000670
(0.00535)
-1.97e08**
(7.67e-09)
0.102
(0.423)
-0.0644***
(0.0203)

-0.000529
(0.00539)
-1.98e08**
(7.90e-09)
0.127
(0.419)
-0.0595**
(0.0243)

-0.000478
(0.00542)
-1.98e08**
(7.81e-09)
0.115
(0.429)
-0.0615**
(0.0239)

-0.000443
(0.00541)
-2.08e08***
(7.60e-09)
0.146
(0.412)
-0.0544***
(0.0168)

-0.000467
(0.00533)
-2.03e08***
(7.30e-09)
0.143
(0.425)
-0.0566***
(0.0155)

N
R-squared

389
0.187

389
0.189

389
0.189

389
0.188

389
0.189

389
0.188

389
0.188

Delta
employment rate

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The middle class effect on the changes in party votes is inconclusive. We see the
interactions are significant for models using elementary and middle school variables. None of the
models using the high school enrollment rate variable is significant. In models using elementary
school enrollment rate as an independent variable (see Table 19), mid1, mid3, and mid4 (Model
3.2, 3.4 and 3.5) are significant and negative. Figure 7 shows that the middle class is attenuating
the effect of enrollment rate on the share of votes. When interacted with elementary school
enrollment rate, an increase in 30 percentage points of mid1 decreases the share of votes as much
as one percentage point (see Figure 7, top left). In other words, an increase in one percentage
point of mid1 decreases the share of votes of the incumbent party in the 2009 election as much as
0.033 percentage point. Similarly, we see that when interacted with elementary school
enrollment rate, an increase in mid3 and mid4 in Figure 7 below is decreasing the share of votes
of the incumbent party (see Figure 7, top right and bottom). In sum, the middle class is
amplifying the negative effect of elementary school enrollment rate on the share of votes.
The interaction between middle school enrollment rate and the middle class, on the other
hand, is positive and significant for Model 3.11 and Model 3.12 (see Table 20). Figure 8 shows
that the effect of middle school enrollment rate on the share of votes of the incumbent party in
2009 is amplified by the presence of the middle class. The middle class is amplifying the positive
effect of middle school enrollment rate on the share of votes. However, one must note that
although we see the marginal effect of the middle class is steep, the confidence interval is quite
large. For Model 3.12 or model using the middle class between $2-10, the lowest tail of the
confidence interval for the value of the middle class of 0.8 to 1 (values where the middle class
effect is significant) is creating a very flat line (see Figure 8). This shows that there is the
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Figure 7. Marginal effects of elementary school enrollment rate on share of votes of incumbent
party.

possibility that the effect of the middle class is very modest. Similarly, for Model 3.14 or model
using the middle class between $6-10, the lowest tail of the CI for each value of the middle class
variable is almost flat (see Figure 8). Thus, if one takes this into consideration, the effect of the
middle class variable in influencing the share of votes could also be very small.
Another thing to note is the relationship between population and the changes in the share
of votes of the majority party in the subsequent election. The models show that an increase in
100,000 of the population will decrease the majority party’s votes as much as 2.5 to 2.8
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Figure 8. Marginal effects of middle school enrollment rate on share of votes of incumbent party.

percentage point, ceteris paribus. The relationship is significant at p<0.01 level. This is contrary
to research by Oliver and Ha (2007) that shows smaller municipalities tend to vote against
incumbents. The delta effective number of parties shows that an increase in one party competing
in the election decreases the share of votes of the majority party by about one percentage point.
Other control variables such as changes in employment rate and GDP seem to have no effect on
the change in votes of the incumbent party.
Local Government Performance in Education
and Political Turnover of Mayors
Model 4 analyzes the impact of the change in school enrollment rates on the change in
the incumbent mayors’ share of votes running for a reelection. There are three enrollment rates
used as the independent variable: elementary school enrollment rate, middle school enrollment
rate and high school enrollment rate.
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Model 4:
MayorVotesi = f (Middle Classi , EnrollRatei, EffPartiesi, Employmenti, GDPi, Middle
Classi x EnrollRatei)
In total, I conducted three baseline models with the independent variables of elementary
school enrollment rate, middle school enrollment rate and high school enrollment rate as well as
18 regressions on all six middle class variables and three school enrollment indicators
(elementary, middle, and high schools) (see Tables 22,23, and 24). The baseline models show
that an increase in middle and high school enrollment rates increases the share of votes of
mayors running for a reelection. An increase in one percent of high school enrollment rate
increases share of votes as much as 0.0021% (Model 4.15, Table 24). An increase in one percent
of middle school enrollment rate increases share of votes as much as 0.271% (Model 4.8, Table
23), ceteris paribus. Model 4.15 shows that elementary school enrollment rate does not affect
share of votes (see Table 22). Again, to put this in context, suppose a mayor in a city of 100,000
was initially elected with 33.4% vote in a three way election. The other two candidates each
received 33.33%. This means that the mayor received 33,400 votes and won by a very narrow
margin. If she runs for reelection against two other candidates in a very similar competitive
election, the one percentage point decrease in elementary school enrollment rate would decrease
her share of votes as much as 0.271% to 33.129% and could cost her the election.
From Model 4.3 and Model 4.5, we can see that at p<0.05, the interaction between
elementary school enrollment rate and middle class is significant for the lower middle class. The
interaction is significant for mid2 ($2-3) and mid4 ($2-4 income per day). In addition to that, at a
p<0.1 significance level, the interaction between mid1 and elementary school enrollment rate is
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Table 22
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta Share of Votes of Incumbent Mayor (DV) and
Elementary School Enrollment Rate (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta elementary
school
enrollment

Model 4.1

Model 4.2

Model 4.3

Model 4.4

Model 4.5

Model 4.6

Model 4.7

0.00273
(0.00175)

-0.0162
(0.0114)

-0.00926*
(0.00560)

-0.00529
(0.00583)

-0.00934
(0.00628)

0.00191
(0.00350)

0.00281
(0.00297)

-0.00601
(0.0716)

mid1

-0.00101
(0.0719)

mid2

-0.0194
(0.0371)

mid3

-0.0192
(0.0556)

mid4

-0.0375
(0.113)

mid5
mid6
mid1*enrollment
rate
mid2*enrollment
rate
mid3*enrollment
rate
mid4*enrollment
rate
mid5*enrollment
rate
mid6*enrollment
rate
Delta effective
number of
candidates
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

-0.214
(0.200)
0.0310*
(0.0183)
0.0430**
(0.0189)
0.0143
(0.00983)
0.0290**
(0.0144)
0.00818
(0.0291)
-0.129***
(0.00776)

-0.130***
(0.00638)

-0.128***
(0.00638)

-0.129***
(0.00639)

-0.129***
(0.00640)

-0.129***
(0.00641)

-0.00112
(0.0508)
-0.129***
(0.00643)

Constant

0.00814*
(0.00492)
4.00e-09
(1.15e-08)
-0.108
(0.339)
-0.0645***
(0.00953)

0.00742
(0.00452)
3.96e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.123
(0.385)
-0.0561
(0.0451)

0.00869*
(0.00449)
4.57e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.0383
(0.387)
-0.0589***
(0.0223)

0.00895**
(0.00453)
4.00e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.0580
(0.388)
-0.0499**
(0.0228)

0.00864*
(0.00449)
4.52e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.0600
(0.386)
-0.0525**
(0.0249)

0.00835*
(0.00454)
3.76e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.0967
(0.390)
-0.0564***
(0.0153)

0.00827*
(0.00463)
3.72e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.117
(0.388)
-0.0513***
(0.0133)

n
R-squared

298
0.601

298
0.600

298
0.603

298
0.599

298
0.602

298
0.596

298
0.598

Delta
employment rate

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 23
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta Share of Votes of Incumbent Mayor (DV) and
Middle School Enrollment Rate (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta middle
school
enrollment

Model 4.8

Model 4.9

Model 4.10

Model 4.11

Model 4.12

Model 4.13

Model 4.14

0.00271***
(0.000951)

-0.00213
(0.00515)

0.00273
(0.00233)

0.00363
(0.00240)

0.00216
(0.00272)

0.00429***
(0.00151)

0.00350***
(0.00133)

-0.0311
(0.0716)

mid1

0.0168
(0.0720)

mid2

-0.00770
(0.0369)

mid3

-0.00217
(0.0554)

mid4

-0.0209
(0.111)

mid5
mid6
mid1*enrollment
rate
mid2*enrollment
rate
mid3*enrollment
rate
mid4*enrollment
rate
mid5*enrollment
rate
mid6*enrollment
rate
Delta effective
number of
candidates
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

-0.181
(0.200)
0.00797
(0.00831)
9.51e-06
(0.00860)
-0.00183
(0.00434)
0.00145
(0.00673)
-0.0173
(0.0131)
-0.129***
(0.00766)

-0.129***
(0.00632)

-0.128***
(0.00633)

-0.129***
(0.00631)

-0.129***
(0.00635)

-0.128***
(0.00629)

-0.0230
(0.0259)
-0.128***
(0.00631)

Constant

0.00862*
(0.00481)
4.67e-09
(1.13e-08)
-0.122
(0.335)
-0.0630***
(0.00960)

0.00844*
(0.00446)
4.44e-09
(1.23e-08)
-0.135
(0.382)
-0.0443
(0.0450)

0.00861*
(0.00446)
4.93e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.113
(0.385)
-0.0676***
(0.0224)

0.00874*
(0.00447)
4.19e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.134
(0.383)
-0.0588**
(0.0228)

0.00860*
(0.00446)
4.71e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.118
(0.384)
-0.0621**
(0.0249)

0.00910**
(0.00447)
3.47e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.118
(0.381)
-0.0608***
(0.0152)

0.00894**
(0.00446)
4.07e-09
(1.23e-08)
-0.129
(0.381)
-0.0560***
(0.0133)

n
R-squared

298
0.605

298
0.607

298
0.605

298
0.605

298
0.605

298
0.608

298
0.607

Delta
employment rate

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 24
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta Share of Votes of Incumbent Mayor (DV)
and High School Enrollment Rate (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta high
school
enrollment

Model
4.15
0.00213**
(0.000919)

Model
4.16
-0.00656
(0.00509)

Model
4.17
0.000697
(0.00227)

Model
4.18
0.00248
(0.00232)

Model
4.19
0.000612
(0.00257)

-0.00884
(0.0380)

mid3

-0.0134
(0.0579)

mid4

-0.0143
(0.112)

mid5

-0.147
(0.200)
0.0145*
(0.00838)
0.00525
(0.00760)
-0.000668
(0.00386)
0.00376
(0.00598)
-0.0117
(0.0118)
-0.0305
(0.0206)
-0.127***
(0.00633)

-0.128***
(0.00756)

-0.127***
(0.00637)

-0.127***
(0.00642)

-0.128***
(0.00638)

-0.127***
(0.00642)

-0.128***
(0.00634)

0.00845*
(0.00498)
5.16e-09
(1.12e-08)
-0.110
(0.333)
-0.0645***
(0.00953)

0.00804*
(0.00447)
4.58e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.104
(0.383)

0.00849*
(0.00449)
4.76e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.116
(0.385)

0.00842*
(0.00448)
5.41e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.119
(0.386)

-0.0466
(0.0453)

0.00835*
(0.00448)
5.76e-09
(1.25e-08)
-0.119
(0.386)
0.0624***
(0.0231)

-0.0597**
(0.0235)

-0.0590**
(0.0260)

0.00859*
(0.00449)
4.50e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.103
(0.384)
0.0635***
(0.0154)

-0.0592***
(0.0134)

298
0.601

298
0.605

298
0.602

298
0.601

298
0.602

298
0.602

298
0.605

Constant
n
R-squared

0.00355***
(0.00132)

-0.00779
(0.0745)

mid2

Delta
employment rate

Model 4.21

-0.0296
(0.0720)

mid1

mid6
mid1*enrollment
rate
mid2*enrollment
rate
mid3*enrollment
rate
mid4*enrollment
rate
mid5*enrollment
rate
mid6*enrollment
rate
Delta effective
number of
candidates
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

Model
4.20
0.00334**
(0.00152)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.00833*
(0.00447)
4.53e-09
(1.24e-08)
-0.103
(0.382)
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also significant (Model 4.2). In dollar terms, the 20-80th percentile middle class represents a
population between on average between $ 1.2 to 2 per day income. In sum, the positive impact of
enrollment rate on share of votes is amplified by the increase in the size of the middle class in a
city, especially the lower middle class. Figure 9 illustrates the relationship. None of the middle
class-middle school enrollment rate and middle class-high school enrollment rate interaction is
significant.

Share of votes of incumbent mayor
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0
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0
.01
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Figure 9. Marginal effects of elementary school enrollment rate on share of votes of incumbent
mayors.
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From Figure 9, we can see that for Model 4.2 (with mid1 or middle class within the 20th80th percentile of the national income population), when interacted with elementary school
enrollment rate, an increase in about 30 percentage points of mid1 (from mid1=0.6 to mid1=0.9)
increases share of votes of incumbent mayors as much as one percentage point (see Figure 9, top
left). In other words, when interacted with elementary school enrollment rate, an increase in one
percentage point of mid1 increases the share of votes of mayors in a reelection as much as 0.033
percentage point. Also in Figure 9, we can see that when interacted with elementary school
enrollment rate, an increase in about 25 percentage points of mid2 or middle class within the
55th-80th of the national income population (from mid2=0.7 to mid2=0.95) increases share of
votes as much as 1 percentage point (see Figure 9, top right). To put it differently, when
interacted with elementary school enrollment rate, an increase in one percentage point of mid1
increases the share of votes of mayors in a reelection as much as 0.04 percentage point. In sum,
the interaction effects show that the positive effect of elementary school enrollment rate on the
share of votes of incumbents is amplified by the size in of the middle class.
Last, for Model 4.5 (middle class between $2-4 income), when interacted with
elementary school enrollment rate, an increase in 35 percentage points of mid1 increases share of
votes as much as one percentage point (see Figure 9, bottom). To note again, the percentage
points of the impact of the middle class variable seem trivial; however, when we consider the
scenario of the three-way mayoral election mentioned above, every vote counts. For competitive
elections, even a 0.01 percentage point change in the share of votes could mean winning or
losing the election.
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Also, we have to note that for all the models in Figure 9, the lowest tail of the confidence
interval for the value of the middle class is creating a less steeper line than the average effect of
the middle class variable. This shows that there is the possibility that the effect of the middle
class is somewhat modest. However, the good news is that if we take the lowest tails of the
confidence interval as the lowest possible values, we can still see a positive relationship between
the middle class variable and share of votes. If we pull a line along the lowest tails of the
confidence interval, we still see a line with a positive slope.
The control variables are showing the expected sign. An increase in one effective
candidate running for a reelection decreases the share of votes of the incumbent mayor as much
as 13 percentage points. In all models, the variable is significant at p<0.01. This is expected since
votes are more likely to be spread out among candidates if there are more candidates competing
in an election.
Local Government Performance in Infrastructure
and Political Turnover in City Councils
Model 5:
PartyVotesi = f(Middle Classi , PavedRoadi, EffPartiesi, Employmenti, GDPi, Populationi
Middle Classi x PavedRoadi)
Model 5 analyzes the relationship between local government performance in
infrastructure and party votes. The dependent variable is operationalized as the difference
between the 2009 election share of votes of a party that won the largest share of votes in the
2004 city council election and the share of votes that the party obtained in the 2004 city council
election. The independent variable is the difference in the percentage of paved roads in cities
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between 2005 and 2008. I exclude cities with 100% of paved roads in both 2005 and 2008 as
this could lead to bias in the estimation. I also drop cities with 100% of paved road in 2005 since
it is possible that a city expands its roads in 2008 but has not paved the roads. Thus, it is possible
for a city to have less paved roads in 2008 compared to 2005 because there are more roads but
still unpaved. In this situation, it is not clear whether the effect of local government performance
on roads on votes is due to the expansion of roads (including the non-paved roads) or the quality
of roads based on the percentage of roads being paved. The complete result is presented below
in Table 25.
In Table 25, the baseline model seems unpromising. Except for the delta effective
number of parties variable, none of the variables is significant including the PavedRoad variable.
In the models with the middle class variables, there are two significant interactions between the
middle class variable and PavedRoad. mid5 and mid6 are interacting with the variable
PavedRoad. Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between the percentage of paved roads and
share of votes when moderated by the middle class variable. The figure shows that as the middle
class increases, the effect of percentage of paved road on share of votes decreases. In a way, the
middle class is punishing the incumbent party for an increase in the percentage of roads being
paved in a city. In the section below, I will elaborate more on the possibilities of why we see the
negative relationship between the middle class and the share of votes of the incumbent party.
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Table 25
Ordinary Least Square Regression Results – Delta Share of Votes of Incumbent Party (DV) and
Percentage of Paved Roads (IV)
Independent
Variables
Delta paved
road

Model 5.1

Model 5.2

Model 5.3

Model 5.4

Model 5.5

Model 5.6

Model 5.7

0.000461
(0.000529)

-2.39e-06
(0.00220)
0.0371
(0.0413)

0.000983
(0.00103)

0.00202*
(0.00115)

0.00151
(0.00122)

0.00123*
(0.000700)

0.00107*
(0.000641)

mid1

0.0532
(0.0335)

mid2

0.0308
(0.0217)

mid3

0.0476*
(0.0283)

mid4

0.0163
(0.0657)

mid5
mid6
mid1*paved
road
mid2*paved
road
mid3*paved
road
mid4*paved
road
mid5*paved
road
mid6*paved
road
Delta effective
number of
parties
Delta GDP per
capita
Population

0.0980
(0.120)
0.000925
(0.00355)
-0.00216
(0.00345)
-0.00310*
(0.00185)
-0.00274
(0.00277)
-0.00804**
(0.00392)
-0.0158**
(0.00688)
-0.00909***
(0.00140)

-0.00914***
(0.00137)

-0.00889***
(0.00136)

-0.00895***
(0.00140)

-0.00888***
(0.00137)

-0.00928***
(0.00142)

-0.00917***
(0.00143)

-0.000533
(0.00577)
-7.71e-09
(8.88e-09)
-0.284
(0.278)

0.000426
(0.00564)
-1.22e-08
(8.15e-09)
-0.271
(0.282)

7.69e-05
(0.00552)
-1.28e-08
(7.82e-09)
-0.294
(0.276)

0.000220
(0.00540)
-1.26e-08
(7.74e-09)
-0.335
(0.271)

9.40e-06
(0.00554)
-1.27e-08
(7.87e-09)
-0.283
(0.275)

0.000964
(0.00549)
-1.20e-08
(7.91e-09)
-0.344
(0.283)

0.000874
(0.00537)
-1.23e-08
(7.77e-09)
-0.363
(0.282)

Constant

-0.0249*
(0.0141)
-0.0639***
(0.0119)

-0.0174
(0.0128)
-0.0855***
(0.0292)

-0.0126
(0.0127)
-0.0782***
(0.0157)

-0.0151
(0.0129)
-0.0795***
(0.0185)

-0.0127
(0.0127)
-0.0838***
(0.0181)

-0.0200
(0.0131)
-0.0623***
(0.0141)

-0.0185
(0.0128)
-0.0649***
(0.0134)

n
R-squared

345
0.200

362
0.207

362
0.209

362
0.211

362
0.210

362
0.210

362
0.210

Delta
employment
rate
Jawa

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Marginal Effects of Paved Roads with 95% CIs
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Figure 10. Marginal effects of percentage of paved roads on share of votes of incumbent party.

Importance of the Lower Middle Class

Importance of Education and Infrastructure to the Middle Class
The importance of citizens within the $2-4 per day income bracket or the lower middle
class deserves further discussion in this section. Why is the lower middle class important in
influencing local governments? If one reviews history, the creation of the new middle class
perhaps could be traced back to the early 1900s when the Dutch through what was called the
Ethical Policy started to improve the living condition of the Javanese people through education.
The policy was triggered by the deteriorating condition of the Javanese people that caused them
to live below subsistence level (Dick, 1985). There was a vast development of elementary
education in villages, and the well to do were given a chance to go to secondary school and
higher education in Indonesia and the Netherlands. The education policy created civil servants
that could work for the government as clerks, accountants, and other administrative jobs. The
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more educated elites that went to secondary and higher education were the ones who became the
national leaders after Indonesian independence in 1945 (Dick, 1985).
If we use Gerke (2002) and Robison (1996) as a reference, the current lower middle class
emerged from the long expansion of education under the New Order era especially starting in the
1980s. The government saw education as a tool to reduce inequality in tandem with distributing
welfare such as cash or rice distribution that was already happening. Education was a way to
reduce inequality through opportunity. As a result, in 1982 and 1983, education was the largest
single budget with the focus of primary education and expansion of junior high school (Dick,
1985). Hence, the poverty level has decreased since the 1980s (ADB, 2010).
One needs to be reminded again that they are not the middle class of the developed
countries. The middle class in the developing world as suggested by Banarjee & Duflo (2008) is
barely above the poverty level or having an income between $2-10 per day. In Gerke and Dick’s
terms, they are the have enough. They are small traders in the market, lower level bureaucrats,
and teachers. More empirically, Dick describes them to have enough money to buy decent
clothing, go to formal occasions, and have decent housings but as Gerke’s says not enough to
have a vacation overseas or buy an expensive house.
What is more important is that the middle class is sending more kids to schools. About
70% of boys and 60% girls 13-18 years of the middle class in the $2-4 income bracket are in
school (Banarjee & Duflo 2008). One can argue that education is not only important for climbing
the social ladder but also to ensure that the middle class children stay in the middle class group.
Education in a sense is also important to make sure that the middle class does not fall back into
poverty. The research from López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011) and Sumner, Yusuf, and Suara
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(2014) below show that education is an important factor preventing the middle class falling back
into poverty.
López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011) find that the people at the lower end of the middle
class spectrum are very vulnerable in facing economic shocks. They show that a household in
Mexico, Chile, and Peru should have $8.4 to $9.8 per day income, or twice of the poverty level
of $4 to have only 10% chance of falling back into poverty when there is an economic shock
affecting the family. Having an income of $5 per day increases the probability of falling back
into poverty to 30%. In short, the closer they are to the poverty line, the middle class households
have a higher probability of falling back into poverty. What is important is that López-Calva and
Ortiz-Juarez (2011) find education to be a consistent predictor in preventing families from falling
back into poverty, the higher the education level of the head of household, the lower the
probability of a middle class family to fall back into poverty.
Following the framework of López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s analysis, Sumner et al.
(2014) look at the probability of the Indonesian middle class in falling back into poverty. To
reach the same probability number of 10%, a person should have at least $3.5 of expenditure per
day to prevent the person from falling below a $2 poverty line. Similar to López-Calva and
Ortiz-Juarez, Sumner at al find that education is a strong predictor in preventing families from
falling back into poverty. Higher education of the head household seems to be correlated with
about 18% of less probability of being poor from the $2 or 19% from $4 per day income level.
Thus, it is not a surprise that the study also finds that there is a relationship between social
protection spending and the lower middle class between the $2-4 per day income. These results

114
suggest that after direct election, municipalities with a larger size of middle class citizens spend
more on social protection since these middle class citizens are prone to fall back into poverty.
It is fair to argue that the lower middle class, who benefited from the expansion of
education that started during the Dutch colonial era and continued in the New Order era realize
that their escape from poverty was in part because of the public education provided by the
government. With education, people can get better jobs in both the private and public sector. It is
important to get jobs outside of the informal sector (van Klinken 2014). A person in rural
Purwakarta can get a job in a textile factory in urban Bekasi. Those who finish high school have
a chance to become a low-level civil servant in Jakarta rather than being stuck selling cellphone
sim cards on the sidewalk in front of a local mall (van Klinken 2014).
Not only that the middle class is more educated, but they also have the means to consume
more (Gerke 2002, Robison 1996). They move to better housings, purchase refrigerators, and
more importantly buy means of transportation such as scooters and cars. A research by Schlogl
and Sumner (2014) shows that indeed there is a parallel trend of the decrease in poverty, in other
words, the increase in the number of people above the $2 poverty line with the increase in the
number of vehicle ownership, especially scooters. The number of scooters also increased
dramatically after 2001. As quoted in Scholgl & Sumner 2014, the Indonesian Statistical Agency
indicates that the number of scooters in 2013 is 76 million. This is equal to one out of three
Indonesian having a scooter. In terms of education level, 70% of those with secondary education
own at least a scooter, while 20% own a car. More than 90% of the population with higher
education have a vehicle with almost 60% of them being a car, while nearly 40% own a scooter
(Scholgl & Sumner 2014).
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Thus, it is perhaps not a surprise that infrastructure is important to the middle class,
NGOs activists that I interviewed, in fact, put an emphasis on infrastructure as an indicator of
whether a local government is performing well (A.A. Hasan, personal communication, August 3,
2016). This is especially true in rural areas in which other indicators are not available. Thus,
physical development, such as roads, sewer system or irrigation system is something that citizens
can see (A. A. Hasan, personal communication, August 3, 2016). However, one also should note
that the models in this study indicate that there is a tradeoff that local governments have to make
in meeting the needs of the citizens. An increase in education spending and social protection
spending to meet the demands of the middle class may be offset by a decrease in infrastructure
spending and other types of spending.
The Middle Class and Political Turnover
Another question that needs answers is why does the middle class reward an incumbent
mayor when there is an increase in elementary school enrollment? Why not high school? Did not
the middle class as described by van Klinken (2014) and Gerke (2002) climb the social ladder
because they at least completed high school?
One possible explanation is that the middle class responds to the changes in elementary
school enrollment rates because almost all elementary schools in Indonesia are public schools
while middle and high schools are more evenly divided between public and private schools.
Thus, almost all elementary schools are under the direct control of local governments while
middle and high schools are not. The ratio of public elementary schools to private elementary
schools is higher compared to the ratio of public middle schools to private middle schools. The
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total number of public elementary schools is almost ten times the number of private elementary
schools. For example, based on the Ministry of Education’s report in 2014-2015, the number of
public elementary schools is 132,609 while the number of private elementary schools is 14,904
(see Table 26). In other words, for every ten public elementary schools that are under the
authority of local governments there is one private elementary school.

Table 26
Composition of Public and Private Schools
Level of
schools
Elementary
school

2014
Public
Private
133,984
14,398

2015

2016

Public
132,609

Private
14,904

Public
132,381

Private
15,155

Middle
school

22,356

13,132

22,209

14,309

22,475

14,548

High school

9,177

14,958

9,482

15,452

9675

15,673

Source: Indonesia Educational Statistics in Brief 2014-2016

On the other hand, the number of public middle schools is quite comparable to private
middle schools. The number of public middle schools is 22,209 while the number of private
middle schools is 14,309. For every ten public middle schools, there are about six private middle
schools. In total, the number of public high schools is lower than the number of private high
schools. In 2015, there are 9,482 public high schools and 15,452 private high schools. This
means that for every six public high schools, there are ten private schools.
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Thus, a better measurement to capture local government performance in education,
especially for middle and high schools is needed. For example, future studies could include
national examination scores for both public and private high schools. From there we can analyze
the performance of schools which are directly under the authority of local governments.
City Council Election: A Caveat

While the middle class is rewarding mayors for increasing school enrollment rate, it must
be noted that in the relationship between city council elections and local government
performance, one sees the conflicting evidence. The middle class is not rewarding the incumbent
party when there is an increase in elementary school enrollment. At the same time, we see an
amplification of the effect of middle school enrollment rate on the share of votes of the
incumbent party. Similarly, one can see the negative relationship between the interaction of the
percentage of paved roads and the changes in the incumbent party’s share of votes when the
middle class is put into consideration. The middle class is not rewarding the incumbent party if
there is an increase in the percentage of paved roads.
Why do we see a different result between school enrollment rate-mayoral election and
school enrollment rate-city council election? First, the separate election system between mayors
and city council could account for the contradicting results. It is possible that a mayor in City A
does not come from the majority party. The current election rule even allows for independent
non-partisan candidates to run for mayoral offices. Thus, the mayors can be rewarded by the
voters due to increasing enrollment rates without any impact on incumbent party in the city
council. Simply put, there are two separate reward and punishment mechanisms between a
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mayor and the incumbent party because the majority party in power do not come from the same
party as the mayor.
Second, in relation to the previous point, it is also possible voters are voting for the good
performance of the mayor’s party which is not the majority party in the city council. Perhaps
there is an undetected coattail effect in progress. It might be the case that the party of the mayor
is receiving more votes because voters think that the mayors are performing well. Thus, they are
voting for the mayor’s minority party in the city council. Arguably, we overcome this issue by
identifying the party of the mayor and put it in the model as a control variable. However, as this
study was conducted the data of party affiliation of the mayor’s for the 500 cities are lacking
especially for the first round of elections in 2005-2008. Furthermore, if such data are available,
many observers of Indonesian local politics argue that there is a weak correlation between
partisan identity of voters and mayoral election. Mayoral election is mainly about popularity of
the mayoral candidates rather than their party affiliation.
Third, perhaps we can attribute the reward that voters give for a decreasing school
enrollment rate to the fact that in a proportional representation system, attribution of
responsibility for local government performance is less clear compared to a single member
district two-party-system. In other words, it is harder to assign blame for the poor performance of
local government in such system. This is because the winner of the election in a proportional
representation city council must form a coalition with other parties to obtain a 50% + 1 vote in
the city council.8 Thus, citizens cannot pinpoint exactly which party that they should reward for

8

Research on the problem of attribution of responsibility and proportional representation are mostly done at the
national level government system by Anderson (1995a), Anderson (1995b), Powell and Whitten (1993), and Fisher
& Hobolt (2010), but it is fair to argue that this problem applies to the local level.
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any achievement of the municipality government. It is possible that one party in the coalition,
which is not the majority party in the city council but part of the 50+1 coalition, was able to
capitalize more on the improvement in local government performance and thus, gain more seats
in the next election and take away the share of votes of the incumbent party. Ideally, one can
overcome this problem by identifying the coalition in each city council. This way we can get a
clearer understanding of what is the governing composition in each city and control for the effect
of the coalition. However, this is hard to do in the context of city councils in Indonesia. No such
data are available for the 500 municipalities in Indonesia. This arguably would be an interesting
and important research project to be done in the future.

CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
H5:

Civil society organizations have a role in enhancing citizens’ participation in local
government decision-making.

The design for the qualitative section was based on Seawright & Gerring’s (2008)
techniques in choosing case studies. I initially chose the informants to cover diverse cases based
on the values of the middle class variable. The cases were six cities that represent the low,
middle and high value of the middle class variable. Two cities have a middle class variable
value of one standard deviation below the mean. Two cities represent the mean value, and two
cities are one standard deviation above the mean. The six cities were to be spread out across the
country and if possible at least one city is chosen from each major island. I prepared a list of
questions to guide my semistructured interview with government officials at the national level
who are an expert in local government finance, local government officials who deal with
budgeting and planning, and nongovernmental organization activists who are experts in
education and local government finance. The questions are listed in Appendix A.
However, due to limited time and funding, I was only able to conduct research in two
provinces in Java. I interviewed a former official in the Finance Ministry dealing with fiscal
transfers, two local government officials who are head of the planning division in their respective
cities and nine NGO activists. The interviews are semi structured interviews based on the
question listed in Appendix A. The NGO activists are based in three major cities who have done
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citizens advocacy and budget research on several cities in Java and Banten provinces. I chose
interviewees based on a snowball sampling that started with the NGO activists from Bandung
Institute of Governance Studies. Thus, as a big caveat, the interviewees are not representative of
the cities in Indonesia. The local government officials interviewed are both from urban cities
with a large number of middle class citizens in West Java. The informants from the NGOs are
more diverse; they operate in cities with small, medium and large populations of the middle
class. In addition to that, the focus of this chapter is a descriptive exploration on the importance
of the middle class in influencing local governments and the roles of NGOs in a civil society
rather than case studies of the influence of the middle class in local government decision-making
in six cities as previously planned.
There are two major themes that emerge from the interviews of both government officials
and NGO activists. First, the interviews suggest that the middle class citizens as individuals have
some indirect influence over local governments. They are not involved directly in the formal
channels of local government participatory planning, but they are mostly using informal channels
to influence and making sure that local governments are held accountable for their actions.
Government officials and NGOs activists that I interviewed indicated that there is a
mechanism for citizens to participate in determining the annual budget and priorities of local
governments. The mechanism to participate started at the desa (village) level, which is two sublevels below the city level government. At this level, citizens and local authorities deliberate and
make budget priorities at each village to be proposed as priorities of that particular village in a
forum called musrenbang or musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan, or deliberation of
development planning. The priorities at the village are then taken to the kecamatan level
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musrenbang, which is one sub-level below the city level government. Representations from each
village (which includes citizens and village level officials) deliberate with other villages to come
up with budget priorities at the kecamatan level to be brought up to the municipality level. At the
city level, representations from all kecamatan deliberate with city officials and the city council to
come up with budget priorities that the city government and city council can approve.
However, the musrenbang is not functioning as it should. Budi Sitepu, a former official
in the Finance Ministry dealing with fiscal transfers, said that unfortunately, the musrenbang are
mostly ceremonials (B. Sitepu, personal communication, July 28, 2016). These are only held to
portray an image of a local government that is listening to the aspirations of the citizens. The
purpose of these events is to fulfill a checklist that shows local governments are following the
standard procedure of good governance set by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Often, local
government officials come up with well-established budget plans, and citizens attend just to
fulfill the invitation without any real critique or input for the plans (A. A. Hasan and H. Adnan,
personal communication, August 3, 2016). An NGO activist, Ari Setiawan, called this pseudo
participation (A. Setiawan, personal communication, August 16, 2016). The citizens come to the
meeting just for the sake of attending the meeting without any real contribution.
Moreover, Rudi Djuansyah, the planning department head of Sukabumi city mentions
that the meetings are held during regular business hours. Therefore, most middle class citizens
who have an 8 to 5 daily job cannot come. More likely the meetings are only attended by
community leaders and the lower class citizens (R. Djuansyah, personal communication, August
3, 2016). It has to be noted that the lower class indeed realize that things have changed, the
lower class citizens realize that decentralization gives them the chance to participate in decision-
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making. However, they are there only to listen and not actively participate. Abubakar Hasan and
Ilhan Srimarga said that most citizens still have a “follower” mentality (A. A. Hasan, personal
communication, August 3, 2016). They are not accustomed to providing ideas and stating their
opinion about what they think the government should do. This is true especially when the village
leaders also attend the meetings. They are reluctant to have an opinion and give input to any
proposals, especially one that is the opposite of the leaders.
At the same time, even if the middle class wants to participate, Donny Setiawan, the head
of an NGO called Inisiatif, mentioned that most middle class citizens actually do not know that
there is a channel to participate in government decision-making. Even if they know that
participation is possible, they do not know how to participate since the procedure of musrenbang
meetings are not widely made known to the citizens. Furthermore, in some cities, attendance in a
city level musrenbang is limited to, for example, 30 people, which is far below the average
population of cities in Indonesia (D. Setiawan, personal communication, August 4, 2016).
The interviews indicate that local governments acknowledge the middle class as a
powerful force in demanding accountability and kicking local government officials out of office
when things go wrong. However, the middle class is not participating in the musrenbang.
Musrenbang meetings are mostly attended by a small number of NGOs, community leaders, and
those who are in the lower class. However, Rudy Djuansyah, the planning department head of
Sukabumi city mentions that the middle class citizens are the ones actively criticizing when
things go wrong. For example, the middle class citizens are the ones who complain when they
learn about class sessions where the teachers are missing. The middle class also asks for a better
quality of education from the local government. In Sukabumi, there was a push by the middle
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class to increase the capacity of ‘good’ public schools at the cost of a decreasing enrollment in
private schools.
A government official suggested that “when the citizens are educated, they read more.
All (local) government policies are criticized” (government official, personal communication,
August 1, 2016). The government official says that she even secretly joined a Facebook group
that actively criticizes the mayor’s policies. From there she monitors the concerns and criticism
from the citizens. In an urban municipality in Java, a mayor created a high-tech command center
that specifically has a team that deals with comments or critiques from these middleclass
citizens. This team follows the Facebook or Twitter feeds of citizens and informs other
departments in the city government if any issues arise so that they can be addressed quickly.
When the mayor recently took office, the citizens were more concerned about the quality of
roads and the mayor concentrated on fixing and expanding infrastructure. After a while, the
concerns and criticism changed and the mayor shifted his focus from infrastructure problems to
other issues.
The nervousness of local government officials about the middle class is also voiced by
Budi Sitepu (personal communication, July 28). He suggests that local government leaders do
not want citizens to be “smart.” In other words, the local leaders are worried that citizens-presumably the educated middle class citizens—already understand the duties of local
governments, how the financial system of local government works, and what citizens can do to
hold local governments accountable for their actions. Local government officials do not want
“tight control from citizens” on how they run the government. For example, Sitepu said that local
government officials often build the perception that intergovernmental transfers are not for the
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citizens. According to Sitepu, a common response to citizens about the nature of
intergovernmental transfers from the central government is “this is not your business; you did
not pay anything.” Local government officials build the perception that only local revenue
sources are the ones that can be controlled. This argument would perhaps work better if dealing
with the less educated poor citizens. Local government officials in municipalities in which the
educated middle class is present would have a hard time in making this argument.
The NGO activists are in unison in saying that the middle class is the one actively
demanding accountability and critiquing local governments. The middle class is the one
reporting indications of corruption in the government. The middle class is protesting government
policies through a letter to the editor (Y. R. Rangkuti, personal communication, August 9, 2016)
or posting problems in social media (A. Setiawan, personal communication, August 16, 2016).
Anecdotal evidence indeed shows that middle class activism attracted some response from local
governments. For example, as Ari Setiawan mentions, citizens in a city in Banten province
posted some pictures of a dilapidated school building until the story caught the attention of the
media (A. Setiawan, personal communication, August 16, 2016). The citizens argue that it is
impossible for the buildings to be in such bad shape if there is no corruption involved since the
buildings are quite new. The media attention forces the district attorney office, which
coincidently had an outreach program to teach students basic understanding of the law, to come
to the school and investigate. Ari Setiawan mentions that this is a typical example of middle
class activism. The middle class is not involved in the planning stages by attending musrenbang
meetings. However, the middle class isactive in criticizing or voicing their concern if the middle
class sees that anything is wrong.
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The Special Role of the Middle Class: The Role of NGOs

Additionally, the interviews reveal that the NGOs have two roles in influencing local
governments. First, through their direct actions, the NGOs work as a civil society force. They
influence local government policies or circumvent the governance system’s failures in handling
social problems. One NGO activist mentions a situation where there was a high rate of maternal
and infant mortality in a municipality (S. Fatimah, personal communication, August 9, 2016).
The head of the health department was told by the mayor to keep this fact quiet. The head of the
health department asked the NGOs to raise awareness about the issue by bringing doctors’ and
midwives’ associations to collaborate and push the city council to provide funding and influence
the city government to handle the issue. With the support from the city council, programs such as
increasing blood supply in hospitals and counseling for husbands with pregnant wives were
established to decrease the number of maternal and infant mortality rates.
NGOs are also influential in making local government accountable with their critiques
and monitoring roles. One example is done by Fitra Sukabumi. In 2014, the organization found
that based on the 2013 State Auditor Agency’s report, the city hospital in Sukabumi did not
sufficiently explain and document the 6.5 billion rupiah that the hospital spent during that fiscal
year. The NGO then reported the findings to the state attorney’s office. Although the result of the
case is still unknown, the report at least forced the mayor to clarify the situation by arguing that
the state auditor’s findings were due to administrative errors. The hospital director also argued
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that the state auditor had been given clarifications and the hospital was waiting for the state
auditor to respond.9
In addition to their direct actions in influencing local governments, the NGOs are
improving the capacity of the poor in making local governments accountable. They are in unison
in saying that increasing the awareness of the poor citizens is important in making sure that
decentralization works. The first thing that needs to be done is to build up the understanding that
in a decentralized era, all citizens have the rights to voice their opinions and demands to the local
government. Unfortunately, feudalism persists in many parts of the society, especially in parts
where leaders are also landlords who control the livelihood of the citizens. Second, the poor
often need assistance in learning how to voice their opinion. Third, the poor also needs to be
made aware and be attentive to government policies beyond the public services that the poor
directly receive.
This is where the role of NGOs as a part of the middle class is important. Before going to
the third point of examining beyond the services that the poor directly receive, the NGOs have to
start by building up understanding and providing training on how to voice their opinion. Ilhan
Srimarga for example, mentions that step-by-step counseling is needed in this matter. For
example, in a meeting with the citizens in a municipality in West Java, he started by asking the
citizens whether they have any concerns of the public services provided by the local government.
Several citizens mentioned their concern about school uniforms. “Why should our children wear
batik to school?” asked the citizens. Arguably having students to wear batik to school on certain

9

This event was brought up during the conversation with Abubakar A Hasan and Hasyim Adnan from Fitra
Sukabumi on 3 August 2016, however, the detail of the case is taken for from a local newspaper outlet in Sukabumi
called Radar Sukabumi. Link to news: http://radarsukabumi.com/2015/01/27/rs-bunut-salah-gunakan-anggaran-rp65-m/

128
days, usually every Friday, forces parents to buy another school uniform in addition to the
standard uniform they wear to school. So Srimarga said to the citizens that they should speak up
if they have any problem. Srimarga then taught them how to bring up the issue with the city
officials, how to ask the questions, what words to use, and even role-played the situation.
The NGOs interviewed also have been pushing the local governments to not only make
budget information available to the citizens but also to publish the budget information in a
language and format that citizens, especially the poor, can understand (A. Setiawan, personal
communication, August 16, 2016 and D. Setiawan, personal communication, August 4, 2016).
Ari Setiawan mentions that citizens will be confused if they are given the budget document.
Thus, to help citizens understand and evaluate local government budgets, his organization
created a forum that involves university students and NGOs to translate budget details to a
language and format that citizens can comprehend. Also, he emphasizes that the citizens do not
need all information from a budget, but they need the main ideas so that they can read and
understand the purpose and agenda of a budget. If they understand, he argues, citizens should be
more involved because they actually care about local government decision-making (A. Setiawan,
personal communication, August 16, 2016). The same sentiment is also shared by Donny
Setiawan. He argues that citizens, especially the middle class care about what is happening
within their own municipalities. Unfortunately, the information provided by local governments is
not straightforward. He argues that a lack of knowledge of local government actions leads to the
perception that middle class citizens do not care about their surroundings. The middle class
citizens actually care if they have the right information. For example, he says that most middle
class citizens do not realize that their vehicle registration tax is earmarked for public

129
transportation development and road improvement, a public service that NGO activists and
government officials agree to be a major middle class priority. Donny Setiawan suggests that if
the middle class citizens know about this, more likely they will pay more attention to how their
money is used to improve the quality of roads and public transportation (D. Setiawan, personal
communication, August 4, 2016).
Another community empowerment effort is training programs for citizens in rural areas
to conduct what the NGOs call a social audit. The trainings teach to the poor how to identify,
evaluate and report how local governments are providing goods and services to the citizens. One
example is a training to evaluate the quantity and quality of a development project to see whether
the project meets the planned specifications. Donny Setiawan described the training his NGO did
in Garut, where citizens were taught how to use the Law 14/2008 on Freedom of Information to
ask the local government for specifications of a road pavement project in the city. The citizens
start from asking the project specification that includes the cost and layout planning of the road
to the city government. From the project layout, citizens evaluated whether the roads were paved
according to the specifications. The citizens then found that the pavement was about several
centimeters thinner than the specified project. The citizens, with the help of an NGO, then
brought this matter up to the court and the contractors were forced to fix the road to meet the
specification proposed (D. Setiawan, personal communication, August 4, 2016).
In Sukabumi, Fitra, an NGO that operates both in Kota Sukabumi (urban city of
Sukabumi) and Kabupaten Sukabumi (rural city of Sukabumi) also empowered and trained the
poor to report public service problems to the NGOs. The city government of rural Sukabumi had
a program to put licensed midwives in every public health services facility in every village. If the
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citizens find a public health facility without a midwife, citizens only need to send a picture of the
facility through a cell phone to the NGO and the NGO can file a complaint against the city. Also,
there are some villages in the Cidahu area that are affected by bottled water plants. The citizens
can also send pictures to the NGO for any environmental damages or violations done by the
factories for the NGO to investigate (A. A. Hasan and H. Adnan, personal communication,
August 3, 2016).
Although the empowerment of the poor can be beneficial in ensuring accountability of
local governments, Donny Setiawan argues that it has its limitations. Donny mentions that when
his organization examined the financial report of a city, his organization noticed that there is
some money deposited in a bank for a certain period. However, his team did not find any
interest-related income on the report. It turns out that the interest income was embezzled by the
municipality. He emphasizes that this exemplifies why the active role of the middle class is
needed, the ones who can understand a complicated local government budget are the middle
class with enough education. He reiterated that it is hard for the poor to understand the items in a
local government budget.
In sum, the qualitative section suggests that the middle class and NGOs matter. The
interviews in West Java and Banten provide an indication that the middle class citizens, directly
or indirectly through the NGOs, are actively criticizing local governments for any problems in
local public services. The middle class is criticizing the governments through social media or by
writing letters to the editor. Through their involvement in NGOs, the middle class citizens are
also active in making sure local governments are accountable. The NGOs are reporting
corruption findings to the judicial system. Also, these NGOs are circumventing failures of local
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governments to handle societal issues like public health. In addition to directly influencing local
government decision-making and ensuring accountability of local governments, the NGOs also
play a role in enhancing the capacity of the poor in playing their part as active citizens. The
NGOs empower the poor to voice their opinions, conduct a simple evaluation on the
implementation and delivery of public services and serve as a conduit or partner in reporting any
public service delivery problems to the local governments.
The generalizability of the qualitative findings is limited. The diversity of Indonesia with
thousands of islands and 500 municipalities is not represented by the informants interviewed.
The study only gives a glimpse of the relationship between the middle class and local
governments in seven cities in West Java and Banten. The snowball sampling method in
choosing informants limits the variance of informants that I interviewed. The government
officials interviewed are both from urban cities with a large middle class. Although the NGO
activists come from diverse communities, the fact that they are all based in Java makes them
unrepresentative of the population of NGOs in Indonesia. Further studies that cover more cities
in Indonesia in areas outside of Java would improve the validity of the preliminary conclusion
generated by this research.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Decentralization does not happen in a vacuum. Economics and public administration
theories that underlie the implementation of decentralization seem to neglect political factors that
affect decentralization. This study has shown that political variables have an impact on
decentralization. The presence of the middle class in a decentralized Indonesia influences the
pattern of local government spending on education and infrastructure. Cities with a larger size of
the middle class tend to have higher education spending after decentralization. At the same time,
the middle class is also rewarding mayors who are performing well. Mayors who can improve
school enrollment rates receive more votes when they are running for reelection. The increase in
votes due to the improvement in school enrollment rate is larger in cities where there are more
middle class citizens.
Decentralization in Indonesia is supposed to give more opportunities for citizens to be
involved in public decision making at the local level. Indonesian lawmakers decided to give
local governments the authority to make decisions on almost all public matters except for foreign
relations, judiciary and law enforcement, religious affairs, macroeconomic and monetary
policies, and defense policies. In 2004, the central government decided to give the rights to
citizens to directly elect their own mayors. The goal is to have local governments that are more
accountable and responsive to the citizens.
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The citizens are also provided with an avenue to shape local government policies through
musrenbang (forums) that are held from the villages to the municipal level. In the forums,
citizens and local government officials are supposed to come up with policy priorities for the
villages. The multiple stage musrenbang is designed so that there is a deliberative process that
involves the citizens at each step of the decision-making process. Unfortunately, the musrenbang
is not functioning as it was designed. Both NGO activists and government officials admit that
citizens are not actively participating in musrenbang. The citizens are attending the musrenbang,
but they are not giving their suggestions on what public goods and services they need from the
municipalities. The middle class citizens are not attending the meetings, lower class citizens who
attend the musrenbang seem reluctant to voice their opinion. Thus, priorities that come out of the
deliberative process are mostly initiated by the local government, without much input from the
citizens.
The study does show; however, that the expansion of decentralization has an impact on
the pattern of local government spending on education and infrastructure. The establishment of
the direct mayoral election increases education spending regardless of the socio-economic
composition of the citizens. At the same time, the increase in education spending is influenced
by the size of the middle class. As the middle class grows, the increase in education spending
due to the direct mayoral election increases. In other words, the increase in education spending
is amplified by the presence of the middle class.
Moreover, direct election also increases infrastructure spending in municipalities. The
increase in infrastructure spending is also moderated by the presence of the middle class.
However, the moderation effect is negative. An increase in the size of the middle class decreases
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the amount of money spent on infrastructure spending. The increase in infrastructure spending
due to direct election is actually attenuated by an increase in the size of the middle class. This
phenomenon perhaps can be attributed to the limitation of what local governments can spend.
How can we interpret the relationship between the middle class and the change in the
pattern of local government spending? The change in the pattern of spending shows that indeed
the middle class matters in local government decision-making. However, if we look at who
participates in the musrenbang, we learn that the middle class is not involved. The evidence
suggests that although the middle class citizens are inactive in the decision-making process, they
are the motor in making sure local governments are accountable for their actions. Direct
elections strengthen the accountability mechanism of local governments. In the past, mayors
were elected by the city councils, making them only indirectly responsible to their citizens. The
fact that the city council elected them created a buffer against citizens’ approval or
disappointment of the mayors’ performance. The citizens were supposed to elect the city council
back into power if they thought that the mayors were doing a good job or the citizens would
replace the city council members if they thought the mayors were performing poorly. However,
because attribution of responsibility in a proportional representation system could be
problematic, there is a possibility that the accountability mechanism of a mayor’s performance
through the city council was not working as it should.
When the direct election of mayors was established, mayors started to realize that the
citizens have one new avenue to voice their policy preferences. The citizens can reward the
mayors who are performing well by reelecting them into office and punish the mayors who are
performing poorly by electing another mayor. The mayors then must start to strategically think

135
about who are the most important forces in local government politics. The study seems to
indicate that mayors realize that the middle class citizens are the ones with the economic and
political resources to influence their survival in office. The middle class actively criticizes when
things go wrong or when there is an indication of corruption in local governments. The middle
class is writing letters to the editor or posting comments on social media when they see a
problem with local government services.
This study also shows that the middle class is also rewarding mayors that are performing
well and punishing those who are not. Mayors who can increase school enrollment rates are
rewarded by the middle class with more votes in a reelection. Mayors with a declining
enrollment rates under their watch are getting fewer votes from the middle class in a reelection.
It can be inferred that mayors then spend more in public services and goods that the
middle class cares about. The mayors increase spending in education because they realize that
education is important to the middle class. Looking at the history of the middle class in
Indonesia, the mayors realize that the middle class depends on public education to rise from and
stay out of poverty. As mentioned in earlier chapters, public education has a long history in
Indonesia that could be traced back to Dutch colonialism and the New Order era. In both
instances, the government provided education to the population to reduce poverty. As a result,
the size of the middle class population increased to more than 40% in 2010.
Mayors are also increasing infrastructure spending since the middle class citizens now
have scooters and cars. The middle class will more likely be happy if they drive on paved roads
and complain if they see potholes. However, this study also suggests that there is a limitation on
how much the mayors can spend. In cities where the middle class is larger, the increase in
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infrastructure spending is lower than in cities where the middle class is smaller. Overall, mayors
are increasing spending in both education and infrastructure. But in cities with a larger middle
class, mayors are prioritizing spending on education over infrastructure.
Theoretical Contributions

This study contributes to theories of decentralization by adding a new political variable:
the middle class. The first generation of decentralization theories under Tiebout (1956) and
Oates (1972) asserted that decentralization would produce allocative efficiencies under the
assumption that there is a benevolent ruler. Political variables are mostly omitted from any
theories of decentralization. The second generation of decentralization theories influenced by
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Niskanen (1974) started to include political institutions in the
discussions. The benevolent ruler assumption is adjusted to viewing politicians as a selfinterested maximizing ruler.
This study extends the theories of decentralization to include the middle class as one
factor that ensures political institutions are working as they should. The literature of
decentralization so far assumes that the electorate is comprised of well-educated middle class
citizens who are willing to participate in politics, have enough knowledge on how a government
should be run, and how to keep the local government power in check. Previous studies by
Grindle (2007) and Guess (2005) have suggested, without empirical support, that engaged
citizens are needed to ensure decentralization is functioning. However, the studies did not
identify further who are the engaged citizens and how are they influencing local governments in
decentralization. This study has shown empirically that in a decentralized system the middle
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class is needed in making sure that local governments are accountable and responding to the
demands of the citizens. Quantitative and qualitative analyses provide evidence that the middle
class is influencing the expenditure decision of local governments and the middle class is
rewarding local governments who are performing well while removing those who are not from
office.
Second, the implementation of decentralization in 2001 in Indonesia allows us to perform
a quasi natural experiment of pre and post-decentralization, which is rarely done. This study
shows that there is an interaction between decentralization and the middle class variable. There is
an increase in education and infrastructure spending when the direct election was established.
The quantitative and qualitative data suggest that the middle class is indirectly influencing local
government decision on spending. When mayors are faced with direct election, they focus their
attention on the strongest political force in the municipality. In doing so, these results suggest
that the mayors tried to match the preference of the middle class by spending more in education
and infrastructure.
Third, the middle class in this study is operationalized in two ways: (1) using a relative
measure of 20-80th and 55-80th percentile of the population and (2) an absolute measure of $2-4,
$4-6, $6-10, and $2-10 per day income ranges. This operationalization of the middle class allows
us to capture the effect of the middle class based on a relative and absolute classification. The
study shows that the middle class variables that have an impact on government spending and
political turnover are the middle class variables of 55-80th (or $2-3 per day) and $2-4 per day
income. Thus, this study strengthens the absolute classification of the middle class suggested by
Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Ravallion (2010) and give caveats on using Easterly’s
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classification. The $2 per day income seems to capture the minimum threshold at which a person
can be considered as middle class. The study has shown that using Easterly’s 20th-80th percentile
classification in the developing countries would capture a large portion of the poor population
below the $2 per day income.
Fourth, the study contributes to the notion that the middle class citizens in developing
countries, as suggested by Banerjee and Duflo (2008), Ravallion (2010) and Asian Development
Bank (2010), are indeed different from the middle class of developed countries in terms of
income but similar in their role in a democratic system. The quantitative and qualitative data
suggest that although the income of the middle class in developing countries is much lower than
the income of the middle class in developed countries, the middle class acts relatively the same
in a democratic system.
The middle class citizens do not have to be the upper middle class with income of $10
per day. Citizens with an income between $2-4 per day, who just recently came out of poverty,
are socially and politically equipped to serve as a force that can influence and hold the local
government accountable. As long as they are not poor, citizens in Indonesia seem to be able to
play their role as the middle class that is needed in a democracy. In other words, as long as they
can fulfill their basic needs, these citizens are aware of what is going on in their municipalities
and are engaged in monitoring the work of local governments. The middle class citizens in
Indonesia are making sure governments are accountable and responding to the demands of the
citizens.
Fifth, the last two points mentioned contribute to the discussion of social class through
two different classifications: (1) a subjective self-identification (Eulau, 1956; Walsh et al., 2004:
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Wright, 2003) and (2) an objective determination using income or assets (Easterly, 2001; Kharas,
2010: Ravallion 2010). The difference between the income level of the middle class in
developing and developing countries gives support to the notion of a subjective selfidentification of social class. The middle class citizens in developing countries seem to perceive
themselves as the middle class even with an income level that is far below the middle class in
developed countries. Both are playing the same role in a democracy. However, the fact that there
is the threshold of a $2 per day income for a person to be considered a middle class seems to
suggest that there are limits to the subjective self-identification of social class.
Sixth, the study also contributes to the literature of political accountability of Romzek
and Dubnick (1987) and Przeworski et al. (1999). It shows that political accountability works
better when the middle class is present. Governments have the incentive to enact policies that
follow the preference of the middle class citizens. If not, they can be kicked out of office in the
next election. The quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the middle class is forcing
local governments to be more accountable, and that the middle class is sanctioning local
governments appropriately. The middle class seems to be voting back those who are performing
well and replacing those who are not.
Seventh, this study contributes to the literature on the relationship between local
government, politics and local government services. One strand of the literature argues that
retrospective voting occurs in local government settings. Voters vote for mayors, city council
members or education board members based on what can they deliver to the citizens (Berry &
Howell, 2007; Boyne et al., 2009, 2012; Hiskey & Seligson, 2003). In other words, local leaders
are evaluated based on their performance in office. Another strand of literature argues that local
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government performance is affected by intrinsic assets of mayors that include experience,
education and political connection (Avellaneda, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Petrovsky & Avellaneda,
2014). This study adds to both strands of literature by arguing that there is a relationship between
local government politics and local government services. Cities with high political competition
tend to spend more. Secondly, this study adds a variable to the literature on retrospective voting
in local governments. There are indications that middle class is amplifying the effect of good
local government performance on the chances of incumbent mayors in being voted back into
office.
In terms of methodology, this study contributes to the scholarship of decentralization by
using a mixed-method approach in a one country setting. This approach has several advantages.
First, it controls for heterogeneity that most likely is present in a multi-country study such as the
form of governments (unitary or federal), the degree of power given to the local government, and
colonial legacy, while still having a large number of observations needed for a quantitative
analysis. Second, the mixed method approach allows this study to triangulate the influence of the
middle class on the work of local governments in a decentralized era. The study’s multi-region
quantitative approach elaborates the effects of causes which explores the average effect of the
middle class on local government spending. This study attempted to complement the quantitative
method with qualitative interviews that seek to find out the causes of effects. However, due to the
of limitation in the variance of the interviewees, it is hard to build rigorous case studies that
could elaborate the causal mechanism in which the middle class is impacting local government
spending and political turnover.
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Contributions for Practitioners

From a policy standpoint, the study shows that the implementation of decentralization
should consider whether the middle class is spread out throughout the country. These results
suggest that the presence of a critical mass of the middle class in each municipality is an
effective way to ensure that local government officials are held accountable. The study has
indicated that in cities where the middle class is present, local governments are more responsive
and more accountable to the citizens. The middle class seems to be rewarding mayors who are
performing well and punishing those who do not through the mechanism of direct election. The
presence of the middle class in a sense also lessens the chance of bureaucratic capture since it is
harder for local government to manipulate the citizens who are more educated. The middle class
citizens are also harder to satisfy with short term patronage from the local governments. The
main way the local government can appeal to the middle class citizens is through good policies
that benefit them as a whole. Thus, development agencies and policy makers in the central
government should consider the composition of citizens of a country, especially whether the
middle class is equally distributed throughout the regions, before implementing decentralization.
This study has shown that the lower middle class is important in a decentralized system.
Having the middle class widely distributed across regions ensures that there is a strong political
force that can hold local governments accountable for their spending decisions. If the middle
class is not distributed equally across regions, it is possible that the accountability mechanism is
only performing well in some local governments and not in others. As the literature and this
study suggest, it is possible that allocative efficiency decreases in cities without a significant
presence of the middle class since the local government can engage in wasteful spending without
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much pressure from the citizens. Furthermore, it is more likely that elite capture, as suggested by
Lewis (2005) and Bardhan and Mokherjee (2006) will happen in cities where such controls from
the citizens are not present. Provision of public service can be used to benefit only a few elites
who have influence over local government decision-making. The increase in corruption due to
decentralization, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) is also more likely in cities where
there is no political force that ensures that local governments are responsible for their actions.
Enacting decentralization without a widely distributed middle class in cities would create a
situation where decentralization improves allocative efficiencies and economic development in
cities where the middle class is present, but make things worse off in cities where the middle
class is not.
Thus, countries and development agencies should think carefully before decentralizing
power to cities where the middle class is not present. This is to ensure that there is a part of the
citizens that can keep the local governments in check. In a country in which the middle class is
not distributed among the cities, the central government should be cautious when decentralizing,
perhaps empowering cities in which there is a significant size of the middle class and closely
monitoring the process in the rest of the cities. For example, local governments that are lacking
middle class citizens should be required to publish and provide their yearly budget planning to
the central government. Or, it is also possible for the central government to regularly send NGO
activists from other cities as a counterpart for the local citizens in making sure that the local
government is in check. In the meantime, the central government should improve education and
economic development so that the size of the lower middle class can grow in the cities that are
not yet decentralized.
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As mentioned in the previous section, the lower middle class citizens with an income
between $2-4 per day are equally equipped as the upper middle class in developed countries.
These citizens seem capable of holding the local government accountable and influencing local
government decision-making. Thus, perhaps having a widely distributed middle class is a simple
policy practice that central governments and development agencies can consider when making
the decision to decentralize power to local governments. An investment in education to create a
sizeable middle class citizens could benefit countries that are considering decentralization in the
future.
Limitations and Future Studies

The study only analyzes the relationship between the middle class and the establishment
of the mayoral direct election as a proxy of decentralization. Ideally, the impact of the middle
class on decentralization should also be analyzed at the stage in which spending power is first
given to the local governments in 2001. However, at the time of this study, the local government
spending data before 2001 are inaccessible. I hope that as data become available and accessible, I
can conduct a more rigorous analysis on the relationship between the middle class and the first
stage implementation of decentralization.
Secondly, the indicator for local government performance on infrastructure is the secondbest indicator available by the time this study was conducted. Arguably, the quality of roads, as
measured by the International Roughness Index (IRI) standard would be a better indicator of
local government performance in infrastructure. I was only able to get access to IRI data from
years 1991 – 2007. The direct election was started in 2005; thus, the IRI data available cannot be
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used to see how IRI affects turnover since the second batch of the direct mayoral elections
started in 2010. Mayors who were elected in 2005 were running for reelection in 2010. I hope
that as data become available and accessible, I can conduct a more rigorous analysis one the
relationship between local government performance in infrastructure and political turnover.
The study suggests that the impact of local government performance on city council
turnover is attenuated by the size of the middle class. An improvement in local government
performance is punished the middle class. The incumbent party is getting fewer votes when it is
performing well. It is possible that we can get a different conclusion if we are able to identify the
coalition of parties in power. One way is to try to find the information from local election
commissions and local newspapers to get the coalitional government that includes not only the
winner of the election but also other parties. Future studies should be able to incorporate this
situation to get a more refined operationalization of city council turnovers.
The study only investigates the influence of the middle class on local government
spending and political turnover. Most of the revenues of local governments come from
intergovernmental transfers. Although local governments have their own sources of revenue,
about 80% of the revenue comes from the central government. In other words, the study only
covers decentralization of spending while leaving questions about decentralization of revenue
untouched. In 2014, local governments were given the authority to set their own property tax
rate. As local governments gain more responsibility in raising revenue, the role of the middle
class becomes more important to analyze. How do the middle class citizens influence taxation
and the effort of local governments in generating revenue? Currently, the time frame of the
implementation of the property tax as well as the availability of data makes it unfeasible to do
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this analysis. Hopefully, as time progresses, I am able to analyze the relationship between the
middle class and taxation and local governments’ effort in generating revenue.
A scatterplot of the middle class and local government spending variables indicates that a
multilevel modeling might be needed in future studies to tackle the clustering of cities within
provinces (see Appendix C). The scatterplot indicates that there is a tendency for cities within the
same province to be close to each other. A design effect test also confirms that a multilevel
model that takes into account the clustering of cities within provinces is a better alternative to
fixed and random effect panel regressions. Thus, future studies on the relationship between local
government spending and the middle class in Indonesia might need to consider using a multilevel
model.
Conclusion

In sum, the study shows that the middle class is important in a decentralized local
government decision-making. Although the middle class is not directly involved in the decisionmaking process, their presence in municipalities is influencing the choices that local
governments make. The pattern of spending of municipalities coincides with the need of the
middle class. The middle class is also rewarding the policies that are enacted by local
governments. If the policies follow the preference of the middle class, the middle class rewards
the mayors and votes them back into office. If not, they will lose votes in reelection.
This study has shown that political factors are important to consider in theories of
decentralization. Future research on decentralization should consider including political
variables such as the composition of the middle class, the electoral system in which
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decentralization happens, or the historical legacies of colonialism on the bureaucratic system,
among others, in evaluating the impact of decentralization on the improvement in allocative
efficiency. To sum up, mayors in Indonesia should be aware that the middle class citizens is
watching them. The mayors, who often are dubbed as little kings after decentralization, need to
ensure that they are performing well, if not they should be ready to have their power relinquished
by the middle class.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND NGO ACTIVISTS
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Interview Questions for National and Local Government Officials:


Why did the central government decide to decentralize and give fiscal and political power to
local governments after democratization?



What are the major changes in the authority of local governments in determining local
budgets?



How is the relationship between the local government and citizens? Is there any avenue for
the citizens to participate in local government decision-making?



How do you assess the role of the citizens, especially the middle class, in formulating the
budget? What is the role of local community leaders, NGOs, and other citizens?



How does spending on education and infrastructure change after decentralization?



Does the new education and infrastructure spending policy after decentralization reflect the
demands of the citizens?



What factors hamper the local governments’ ability to be responsive to the demands of the
citizens?



Does the focus of local governments on one particular sector of government spending such as
education negatively other types of public services?

160
Questions for NGOs and local community leaders:


What are the major changes the authority of local governments in determining local budgets?



How do local government officials perceive the new budgetary power given to them?



Do local governments change their pattern of spending after decentralization? What were the
spending priorities of local governments after decentralization? Were the changes a result of
a top-down or bottom-up approach?



How is the relationship between the local government and citizens, NGOs and community
leaders?



How does spending on education and infrastructure change after decentralization?



Does the new education and infrastructure spending policy after decentralization reflect the
needs of the citizens?



How do you assess the role of the citizens, especially the middle class, in formulating the
budget? What is the role of local community leaders, NGOs and other citizens in general?



What is the role of the middle class in making sure that government is accountable?



Does the focus of local governments on one particular sector of government spending such as
education or roads negatively other types of public services?



What is the role of your organization in influencing local government policies?



What is the role of your organization in making sure the local government is accountable?

APPENDIX B
FIXED EFFECT PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS:
AGRICULTURAL, ECONOMIC, HOUSING,
AND PERSONNEL EXPENDITURES
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Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results - Social, Agricultural, Economic, Housing, Personnel
Spending (DV) and Middle Class 55-80th Percentile (IV)
Independent
Variables

Housing
Expenditure

Personnel
Expenditure

0.211***
(0.0475)

Economic
Development
Expenditure
0.136
(0.0827)

-0.211
(0.130)

6.111***
(0.555)

-2.692
(2.273)

10.27**
(4.014)

3.745
(3.319)

-20.54**
(8.846)

188.9***
(33.86)

Constant

2.08e-07
(1.39e-07)
4.46e-07
(1.73e-06)
-1.121*
(0.574)
-5.010**
(2.202)
5.197**
(2.089)
3.055**
(1.354)

2.98e-07
(1.99e-07)
8.02e-06**
(3.54e-06)
1.674**
(0.684)
-16.27***
(3.262)
15.47***
(3.629)
7.069***
(2.321)

6.86e-07***
(2.51e-07)
3.12e-06
(6.89e-06)
1.028
(0.977)
-6.597*
(3.361)
10.94***
(3.389)
1.961
(3.188)

3.52e-07
(5.88e-07)
4.53e-06
(1.66e-05)
-4.934
(3.511)
-21.34*
(11.60)
-11.66
(14.43)
25.82***
(9.073)

1.15e-05**
(4.49e-06)
0.000250***
(4.70e-05)
31.11***
(6.282)
-22.35
(23.68)
143.5***
(27.58)
-114.1***
(27.90)

n
R-squared
Clusters

2,899
0.043
421

3,206
0.145
421

3,216
0.059
421

2,390
0.079
421

3,588
0.498
421

Effective
number of
parties
Percentage of
People in
Urban Area
GDP in
constant price
Population
Direct
election
mid2
mid2*direct

Social
Expenditure

Agricultural
Expenditure

0.202***
(0.0244)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results - Social, Agricultural, Economic, Housing, Personnel
Spending (DV) and Middle Class $2-4 (IV)
Independent
Variables

Housing
Expenditure

Personnel
Expenditure

0.0839*
(0.0468)

Economic
Development
Expenditure
0.111
(0.0860)

-0.262**
(0.131)

5.905***
(0.551)

-2.505
(2.244)

5.483
(4.001)

2.702
(3.424)

-19.49**
(9.219)

175.5***
(33.70)

Constant

2.10e-07
(1.37e-07)
3.21e-07
(1.76e-06)
-0.606
(0.533)
-2.852*
(1.593)
2.700*
(1.405)
2.663*
(1.381)

3.53e-07*
(2.12e-07)
1.08e-05***
(3.95e-06)
5.342***
(0.720)
21.98***
(4.240)
-7.057*
(3.644)
-0.592
(2.569)

6.95e-07***
(2.63e-07)
4.00e-06
(6.94e-06)
1.942**
(0.786)
3.876
(2.937)
3.391
(2.484)
-0.329
(3.369)

2.74e-07
(5.69e-07)
-2.23e-07
(1.73e-05)
-7.519**
(3.518)
-38.68***
(9.287)
9.754
(9.801)
33.87***
(9.554)

1.14e-05**
(4.59e-06)
0.000265***
(4.89e-05)
28.50***
(6.269)
63.11**
(25.65)
82.92***
(25.25)
-134.9***
(29.14)

n
R-squared
Clusters

2,899
0.041
421

3,206
0.169
421

3,216
0.060
421

2,390
0.087
421

3,588
0.507
421

Effective
number of
parties
Percentage of
People in Urban
Area
GDP in constant
price
Population
Direct election
mid4
mid4*direct

Social
Expenditure

Agricultural
Expenditure

0.199***
(0.0250)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Note: The 2 digit numbers represent the province code according to the SUSENAS data.
Education spending is in billion rupiah at constant price and the middle class variable is mid4
(the middle class between the $2-4 per day income)

